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1. THE RESEARCH PROJECT  
1.1. Motivation 
This PhD thesis discusses the impact of Cloud Computing infrastructures on Digital 
Forensics in the twofold role of target of investigations and as a helping hand to 
investigators. The Cloud offers a cheap and almost limitless computing power and storage 
space for data which can be leveraged to commit either new or old crimes and host related 
traces. Conversely, the Cloud can help forensic examiners to find clues better and earlier 
than traditional analysis applications, thanks to its dramatically improved evidence 
processing capabilities. In both cases, a new arsenal of software tools needs to be made 
available. The development of this novel weaponry and its technical and legal implications 
from the point of view of repeatability of technical assessments is discussed throughout 
the following pages and constitutes the unprecedented contribution of this work.   
1.2. Introduction 
Cloud Computing is a business model which advocates Information Technology as a 
service consumable on demand rather than as an endless pursuit to assets purchase. The 
idea of computational resources delivered proportionally to user needs and accordingly 
charged dates back to the mid sixties, but during the last decade only the remarkable 
advances in data center management have entailed economies of scale able to drop fares 
and level them to utilities such as water or gas. The Cloud is changing the way companies 
and public administrations are approaching IT and seems eligible to play a role so 
revolutionary to be compared to other milestones of technological evolution like the 
Internet or mobile telephony.  One of the side effects of this overwhelming rise is a major 
impact on Forensic Computing, the science that deals with techniques and procedures to 
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handle electronic equipment as a possible source of evidence in a trial. From one side, the 
pervasive availability of cheap cloud computing services for data storage, either as a 
persistence layer to applications or as a personal store for documents and pictures, is 
remarkably increasing the chance that cloud platforms potentially host evidence of 
criminal activity. When this happens, collecting data in a way that is able to resist to legal 
and technical vetting may reveal itself very tricky, because forensic tools targeted to cloud 
infrastructures are still in their infancy and issues concerning jurisdiction may apply. 
Relevant data may indeed be fragmented in countless shards, possibly available for a very 
limited timeframe and residing in more than one country. Furthermore, it is common 
practice for cloud providers to rely on services delivered by third parties ( as in the case of 
Dropbox leveraging Amazon's Simple Storage Service): this may force investigators to 
potentially turn to more CSPs, possibly residing in different countries, in order to request 
registration forms, log files and ultimately raw data. Once presented a proper court order, 
cloud providers would be in the best position for extracting relevant data from their 
platforms in the most reliable and complete way. However, this kind of services are not so 
widespread to date and, therefore, the need to adopt a structured and forensically sound 
approach calls for an innovative software weaponry which allows remote acquisition of 
storage accounts by leveraging the low level programming interfaces exposed by 
providers. From another side, the Cloud may constitute a formidable ally to forensic 
investigators. Its massive computational power and storage capacity can be harnessed to 
achieve elastic scalability, fault tolerance and timely results from analysis activity, so to 
conveniently master huge amounts of digital evidences that otherwise could be impossible 
to wield. Indeed, traditional tools running in standalone or a client-server environment 
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may fall short when handling the multi terabyte scale of a complex case or, conversely, lie 
mainly underutilized when dealing with few digital evidences. This matches the reduced 
willingness of budget constrained decision makers in investing capitals for building new 
datacenters and therefore boosts the appeal of business models like Cloud Computing that 
propose the concept of IT as a pay as you go. The Cloud rests on a solid foundation of well 
established technologies, but is a giant leap compared to classic hosting when it comes to 
availability and self service provisioning of resources. There is something really new 
under the sun. E-commerce platforms, large scale web site indexing and social networking 
have forced the pioneers of IT like Google, Amazon, Microsoft and Facebook to rethink the 
very meaning of managing a data center in order to tackle the “Big Data” issue: 
 distributed file systems running on many networked commodity servers that allow to 
sum up the cheap directly-attached storage and efficiently compensate for failures even 
of an entire rack; 
 NoSQL databases (Strauch, 2011) that waive to the strict ACIDi compliance of 
relational DBMS, but in return achieve a gorgeous scalability over many nodes with 
impressive write performances and overall availability; 
 parallel programming models that split the input data into chunks that can be 
processed concurrently by many computers and finally consolidate the results; 
 pervasive scripting that allows achieving a high level of automation so that one single 
administrator can manage hundreds of machines or more. 
To leverage all the benefits offered by ICT as a service, a new category of forensic 
distributed applications are needed though, where a variable amount of fairly affordable 
computers are opportunistically engaged to share a slice of the overall computational 
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burden. The established calling convention of digital evidence will be useful in the 
following to address all the electronic devices that might be relevant in a criminal case and 
which elevate to the rank of proofs only when their evidential contribution is ascertained 
in a court of law before an unbiased judge. 
1.3. Research objectives 
Concerning the Cloud as a target for investigations, the research concentrates on studying 
the maturity level from a forensic standpoint of the programming interfaces published by 
providers to allow remote retrieval of content. It is interesting in particular to assess which 
capabilities are offered to find deleted files and past revisions of documents, protect access 
from accidental modifications and retrieve objects metadata, the "data about data" which 
may locate a user action in a specific point in time. This preliminary assessment will lead 
to devise the requirements and blueprint of a novel forensic tool which allows the 
examiner to navigate from a remote workstation inside personal cloud storages and make 
a faithful logical copy of content and metadata to a local mass memory in a way that could 
be called "cloud dd"ii.  A prototype desktop application, namely Cloud Data Imager, has been 
developed which offers a read only access to files and metadata of Dropbox, Google Drive 
and Microsoft OneDrive storage facilities, allowing directory browsing, file content view 
and imaging of remote folder trees to local memory devices with export to widespread 
forensic formats. During this journey, there will also be room for revisiting the concept of 
repeatable technical assessment according to the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure 
(CCP), art. 360 CCP and 117 of Implementing Provisions of CCP, in the case of remote 
acquisitions of cloud data. Indeed, when dealing with physical mass memories there is 
always a chance of evidence damage, if a proper preservation and handling policy was not 
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in place. The very action of powering an evidence could also damage it permanently 
because of electrical shocks. Conversely, these concerns do not apply for cloud 
infrastructures which are nearly always available and fault tolerant. Therefore it will 
interesting to evaluate if a remote acquisition repeated over time will lead to invariable 
results or evaluate the importance of occurred modifications. Coming to the role of Cloud 
platforms as helping hand to cleverly analyze a vast amount of digital evidences gathered 
from a case,  the novel contribution of this work consists in discussing the design goals, 
technical requirements and architecture of AlmaNebula, a conceptual framework for the 
analysis of digital evidences built on top of a Cloud infrastructure and able to suit the 
needs of  a small unit as well as a structured forensic department. This aims at embodying 
the concept of "Forensics as a service", a type of service offered by a cloud infrastructure 
where evidence devices are uploaded to provider's premises (most likely in a private or 
community deployment scenario) and their content is extracted, processed and made 
available to analysts by means of intuitive interfaces in order to allow detection of 
actionable knowledge. 
1.4. Project outline 
The rest of this work is organized as follows: next chapter deals with the Cloud 
Computing business model and discusses its foundations, benefits and risks. The third 
chapter gives a due background information about the national strategies devised by some 
countries to grasp all the relevant opportunities that it offers. It does not happen by chance 
if the nations who are best positioned to contribute to cloud forensics are generally the 
ones that already devised a formal and structured approach to evaluate cloud technology 
adoption. Chapter 4 opens the core discussion concerning forensic subjects as it delves into 
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the main aspects of investigations targeted towards cloud storage areas, discussing the 
limitations of currently available tools and detailing the requirements applicable to a novel 
forensic software fit for remote acquisitions. The internals of Cloud Data Imager complete 
with on field tests are presented and a discussion concerning the comparison to the 
traditional seize/bit-copy approach is included. Chapter 5 deals with repeatability issues 
in the context of a remote acquisition scenario. Chapter 6 surveys the state of the art of free 
and open source forensic tools for evidence analysis, lists their limitations and presents 
AlmaNebula's core concepts, requirements and architecture. Conclusions are drawn in 
chapter 7. 
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2. CLOUD COMPUTING 
People are routinely confronted with the alternative to make or buy something and 
usually the decision depends on the balance of key factors like quality, cost and delivery 
times. As an example, one could decide to reserve a deposit box in a bank instead of 
placing a safe in a wall of his house. This might happen because the need of storing 
valuable goods is limited in time or to avoid annoying masonry works. For the same 
reason, instead of equipping a fully functional but maybe normally undersubscribed data 
center, a company could decide to charter ICT assets like storage or bandwidth according 
to a profile that closely matches its needs: more power during demand peeks and partial 
or total release of resources when exigency declines. The possibility of consuming ICT as a 
tailored self service is one of the main features that distinguish Cloud Computing (CC) 
platforms from traditional forms of outsourcing, where a much tighter and less timely 
interaction with the provider was needed to size the necessary computing power. It 
appears that the credit to have pronounced the word Cloud Computing (CC) in its present 
meaning goes to Erich Schmidt, former Google's chief executive officer. In August 2006 at 
the Search Engine Strategies Conference he talked about an emerging business model 
where the computation and the data were hosted by servers located ".. in a cloud 
somewhere". Beyond the popular representation that look at the cloud like as an opaque 
container of data injected and retrieved by any internet enabled device, Cloud Computing 
strives to embody the concept of "ICT as a service": a constant availability of storage, 
computational resources and software platforms that are delivered to the final customer 
through a network, scale in and out dynamically and are charged only for the time of real 
utilization, resulting in no upfront cost or long term commitment. ICT resources that can 
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be opportunistically engaged and decommissioned at user will with little or no 
intervention of the entity that owns or manages them, the cloud provider. In this respect, 
one could be misled into thinking that, once removed the topping made of a thick layer of 
marketing hype, what is left is the old seasoned outsourcing business model just 
rebranded. Indeed, not all cloud offers were made equal and the term Cloudwashing was 
just coined to address those services which do not comply to cloud platforms key 
characteristics, but however are advertised as such because none would otherwise 
consider them by now. For certain, it is very difficult having brand new ideas, especially in 
the ICT arena. The concept of a cheap, elastic and virtually infinite computing power that 
could be reached remotely dates back to the mid 1960s (Parkhill, 1966) and largely 
anticipates the formal definition of cloud computing set forth by the NIST in 2011 (see next 
paragraph). It is also indisputably true that  CC rests on well established foundations as 
many of its building blocks have a long track record: economy of scale, resource sharing, 
disaster recovery or machine virtualization have been devised decades ago to tackle ever 
green problems that haunt the dreams of Chief Information Officers (CIO) all over the 
world: continuity of operations, low data center average utilization, intermittent and 
disrupting demand peaks, long delays in procurements of assets and, most importantly, 
the chance to be relieved from ICT management in order to take care of company's core 
business only. However, there is much more to it. New economic, infrastructural and 
technical drivers only in recent times have realized what fifty years ago could just be 
imagined and promise to make CC one of the most important business models in IT 
history: 
 The cloud pioneers: thanks to the work of precursor companies like Amazon and 
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Google, the long held dream of the computer as a pay per use utility like electricity or 
water, has made true (Parkhill, 1966). Affordable services, ranging from plain disk 
space availability to fully fledged virtualized infrastructures, are now at reach of every 
user because of unprecedented improvements and optimizations of data centers 
management. Economies of scale due to massive purchase of goods, use of commodity 
material instead of expensive redundant equipment and tight cooperation between 
software development and system administration teams has significantly lowered the 
operative expenditure needed for running the infrastructure. 
 Budget constraints: considerations above match the persistence of the financial slump 
that is hitting very hard during these years. Economic resources lack and decision 
makers, routinely struggling with shrinking budgets, have much less aptitude than in 
the past in investing capitals for buying or refurbishing some likely underutilized 
server farms. Under some circumstances it is better renting than facing the fixed costs 
of owning. This increases the interest for business models like cloud computing that 
promises to drop the time to market when starting new projects thanks to its flexibility 
and speed in provisioning and releasing computation resources. 
 Internet bandwidth: generically available Internet access speed grew by something 
coarsely close to two orders of magnitude from 2000 to 2011iii and therefore is getting 
more and more feasible moving to the cloud applications that historically abode in 
corporate local networks only. 
 Cloud software development: A virtually infinite computing power would be 
pointless if not properly backed up by an appropriate software offering. A large 
portfolio of ready-made applications and development platforms which are granted an 
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ubiquitous access, have dropped production delays and avoided many nuisances 
stemming from a per machine installation and update of packages.  
2.1. The NIST definition of cloud computing 
Even if there is no universal agreement on what CC exactly is, there is a widespread 
acceptance of the definition given by the US National Institute of Standards and 
Technology NIST (Mell and Grance, 2011), the organization identified in a key paper by 
former US CIO Vivek Kundra (Kundra, 2010)a as the authority appointed to guide US 
Public Administrations in their migration path to cloud services. According to NIST, 
Cloud Computing has five fundamental features, three service models and three 
deployment models as depicted in figure 2.1. 
 
 
2.1.1 Essential characteristics 
 On demand self-service: computing resources can be unleashed by the customer 
when needed and without human interaction with the cloud provider. This is a giant 
leap compared to the classic outsourcing model that usually required the reservation 
of ICT capabilities beforehand and entailed a strong dependency from the provider. 
Figure 2-1 Features, service and deployment models of CC according to NIST 
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CC brings loose coupling in resource provisioning, although not complete 
independence. For instance, some provider enforce a baseline policy which limits the 
number of virtual machines that can be started concurrently (20 in the case of Amazon 
Elastic Compute Cloud EC2). Increasing this limit is possible, but can require a sort of 
out of band interaction with customers like filling a request form. We further have to 
notice the lack of programmability as a necessary feature of a cloud platform, that is the 
exposure of the infrastructure capabilities through library calls that could be invoked 
inside user programs. This allows an additional degree of freedom compared to 
prebuilt control panels already offered by the cloud provider. The authors of NIST 
special publication 800-145 possibly included programmability in the Self Service 
characteristic, but nevertheless we feel that this concept is so important to deserve an 
explicit citation as an autonomous feature. 
 Broad network access: cloud resources have to allow a network access (not necessarily 
the Internet) via protocols that facilitate the usage of the broadest spectrum of remote 
terminals. Usually cloud platforms are reachable through RESTiv or SOAPv web 
services, encapsulated in HTTPvi or HTTPSvii payloads. 
 Resource pooling: A single instance of a resource is shared among many customers 
using a multi-tenant model that enforces isolation of customers' data. This means that 
if the resource is an application, the code base is the same, but appearance is 
personalized and data are segregated, usually using database tables. In case of 
hardware components, multi-tenancy is achieved through virtualization that 
inherently separates users at operative system level. As the word Cloud suggests, the 
geographical location of assets is transparent to the final users that only may decide to 
 
18 
 
confine them at macroscopic level, as in the case of data handling in a specific country 
for regulatory compliance. For instance, to meet their legal obligations, Amazon EC2 
customers can place their resources, such as virtual machines, in one or more of ten 
Regions worldwideviii: Asia Pacific Tokyo, Asia Pacific Singapore, Asia Pacific Sydney, 
EU Ireland, South America San Paolo, US West Northern Virginia, US West Northern 
California, US West Oregon, US GovCloud and the brand new China Beijing. Regions 
are located in a single country and contain Availability Zones, which corresponds to 
data centers interconnected with high speed links. Users could decide to confine their 
resource in more than one availability zone of a region for disaster recovery purposes, 
but as the location of these zones is not advertized, a region remains the only 
landmark for resource placement. 
 Rapid elasticity: Cloud services can be elastically provisioned to quickly scale out in 
case of peak demand and be quickly released during idle times. This behavior allows 
one to arrange at need seemingly unlimited computing resources for a very reasonable 
amount of money and represents a great deal of efficiency compared to the static and 
often oversized data center that can be found in the average company. The property of 
“elasticity” is widely presented as a major breakthrough of this business model as one 
of the most generally appreciated characteristics of cloud computing resides in the fast 
provisioning of resources. Let’s consider for example the Auto Scaling feature of 
Elastic Compute Cloudix, the  computing platform of Amazon that enables customers 
to run concurrently up to thousands virtual machines (VM). Auto Scaling monitors a 
running instance’s resources and is able, according to a predefined policy, to start 
automatically other virtual machines (within minutes) when, for example, CPU usage 
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reaches 80% and, conversely, to stop them when load drops to 50%. 
 Measured service: Monitoring and reporting resource usage (e.g. CPU time, 
bandwidth or disk space) is a key point not only for auto scaling capabilities, but also 
to deliver a metered and transparent service to the final customer. 
2.1.2. Service models 
 Software as a Service: Customers rent readymade applications running in the cloud 
service provider (CSP) premises: office productivity, customer relationship 
management, sales, business intelligence and many more. Access can be granted from 
a variety of client devices or by means of a program interface. Users are offloaded from 
any management task and are thus able to focus on their core business, but conversely 
there is little or no capacity to influence key features like the format in which 
information is stored, with possible issues of data transfer back at a later time. 
Salesforce is just an example of SaaS. 
 Platform as a Service: is the possibility for users to develop applications from scratch 
with high level programming languages like Java or C# that leverage CSP's hardware 
resources by mean of an Application Programming Interface exposed by the provider 
(usually proprietary). There are still no management tasks that are not related to 
application maintenance. Microsoft Azure and Google App Engine are an example of 
Paas. 
 Infrastructure as a Service: It's a remote server farm made of virtual machines, 
pluggable block stores (external virtual volumes much similar to USB disks) and object 
stores (these will be extensively discussed in chapter 4 and 5 for their utmost 
importance from  a digital forensics standpoint) at user's disposal as full administration 
rights are granted. Total freedom as to operative system selection and application 
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development of applications is balanced with an important burden of logical IT 
management shared with CSP that only retains control of the underlying infrastructure 
(from Virtual Machine Monitorx to physical security). Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud 
offers, among others, IaaS services. 
2.1.3. Deployment models 
 Private cloud: The cloud platform is run on or off premises for the exclusive needs of a 
single organization that can either be the owner and operator or can rely on third 
parties. 
 Community cloud: Same as private, but here a group of organizations with shared 
interests and concerns come together to consume cloud services. 
 Public cloud: The most common form. Cloud infrastructure is located at the premises 
of a commercial party which owns and operates it to sell its services to the general 
public. It must be considered that some cloud providers may rely on assets of others as 
in the case of Dropbox that rests on Amazon's Simple Storage Service. 
 Hybrid cloud: Results from the composition of infrastructures belonging to the 
previous models. Each of them still stands as an autonomous entity, but is able to 
interoperate with the others by means of standard or proprietary protocols that allow 
migration of data and applications.  
2.2. The true meaning of the cloud 
As noted by Randy Bias, co-founder and CTO of Cloudscaling, elasticity is not a core 
propriety of the cloud, “but rather a side effect” (Bias, 2010). To bring cheap computing 
facilities to the masses at an adequate scale, companies like Google, Amazon, Yahoo and 
Microsoft needed to pioneer a new concept of ICT, bringing an unprecedented level of 
 
21 
 
efficiency and cost effectiveness in running computation resources. In traditional 
datacenters, servers are confined in the same area for physical security and maintenance 
purposes only. They share air conditioning and power system, but have very dispersed 
hardware/software setups and management units that typically use commercial tools for 
every day operations. Each server communicates with a few others and can count on 
expensive high-end equipment such as enterprise class disks handled by array controllers 
with fault tolerance capabilities (RAID). The number of machines per system 
administrator is relatively low and changes due to new releases of applications are 
infrequent. 
2.2.1. The warehouse-scale computer 
Conversely, large Internet operators introduced the concept of “warehouse-scale 
computer” (Barroso and Holzle, 2009). This refers to clusters of hundreds of servers or 
more that run the same distributed application and behave as a single machine. Use of 
commodity hardware, such as 1 Uxi servers equipped with directly-attached desktop class 
disks or ordinary 1 Gbit/s network switches, limits costs for provisioning, even if the 
inherently higher rate of failures of this material raises the problem of fault tolerance not 
at component level, but at server level. So redundancy is achieved by putting intelligence 
within the software and replicating data on many nodes that belong to separate clusters 
with a distributed file system such as Google’s File System (Ghemawatt, Gobioff and 
Leung, 2003), so that the breakdown of a entire rack of machines would not affect service 
availability. This is in addition to the choice of keeping low the number of templates of 
hardware/software platforms not to make asset management a real nightmare. A unified 
administration team with a “DevOps”xii mentality which writes its own scripts completes 
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the picture and allows reaching high level of automation, thousands of managed servers 
per system administrator and timely release of new application versions. The combined 
effect of automation, DevOps culture and use of commodity hardware brought elasticity 
as side effect (Bias, 2010). 
2.2.2. DevOps 
The DevOps culture (Edwards, 2010) harmonizes the activity of two historically separated 
corporate areas: development and operations. The former is in charge of creating new 
applications and has a mentality naturally open to change. The latter is requested to 
manage systems in order to create a safe environment for those applications to grant 
services availability. Changes to reliable setups are therefore perceived as dangerous 
because they can introduce bugs, security flaws and instability. The contraposition is 
increased when the two departments have separated office locations and when they report 
to unrelated managers. Developers usually work with rich graphical integrated 
development environments (IDE) that run in a single workstation or between few 
machines well connected with high speed local area networks. System administrators on 
the contrary work with server operative systems that may have poor user interfaces 
(possibly command line interfaces only), use scripting languages for every day 
maintenance tasks and deal with security appliances and slower wide area networks. 
Development process is targeted to functionalities and performance, less frequently to 
security. Consider the case of a new application for office productivity that is based on a 
communication protocol like Remote Procedure Call (RPC). In Windows servers RPC 
implementation features a dynamic port allocation according to which client and server 
agree to exchange data on a random chosen port whose number is greater than 1024. 
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When software is sent for production, operations guys will be probably disappointed 
because they do not know a priori which ports the application will use and will be forced 
to open an entire port range in the firewall, possibly exposing servers to attacks. So they 
will probably return the artifact to developers, stating that it is not suitable for production 
for security reasons and starting a tennis game that determines a complete waste of time. 
The mishap can be overcome with some workaround like “tunneling” (encapsulating RPC 
into single port protocols like HTPP that merely acts like a transport layer) or with some 
registry hack, but this is one of the uncountable examples of troubles that could be 
avoided with a tighter cooperation between the two teams. First of all, DevOps philosophy 
tries to disseminate a business culture among managers, software engineers, system 
administrators, testers and all other components of the production chain. All of them 
should be aware that they share a common goal of making high quality applications that 
fulfills the needs of customers. There is no room for working in isolation, no room for 
sentences like: “It works on our machines. Just lob the problem over the wall” (Nelson 
Smith, 2010). Theory is brought into practice by increasing contacts between software and 
deployment people (meetings, instant messaging, conference calls) and by adopting 
unified processes and tools, version-controlled software repositories and a lot of 
automation of lengthy and error prone manual tasks (Edwards, 2010) . 
2.2.3. What does it take to build a Cloud? 
Being a cloud provider means all of this. Before building a private cloud it must be 
carefully considered that the creation of a private or community cloud, overlooking the 
aforementioned key points of server farms organization and management typical of public 
deployments, means delivering undoubtedly useful scalable virtual machine services, but 
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may be far from the effectiveness of a disrupting technology. One must wonder if it is 
feasible to uproot the current processes, unhinge consolidated, but maybe unproductive 
traditions, harmonize the work of development (often outsourced) and deployment 
(maybe  outsourced to a different contractor or handled in house). Scale should not 
necessarily be viewed as a problem. One can think that it is needed a server population 
that is comparable to the one owned by a large web operator in order to raise a successful 
cloud infrastructure. This might not be true. The point here is not collecting millions of 
machines, but the way processes and people are organized. The critical mass can vary 
significantly and could not be so difficult to achieve, especially if more organizations come 
together. Just to start with a rule of thumb, one must consider the current number of 
server managed by a single system administrator in his organization (it should be a 
number ranging from 10 to 50 in the average) and multiply by a factor depending on the 
level of expected efficiency. 
As Bias says:”Are on-demand automated virtual machines an infrastructure cloud? I would argue 
no. That’s not ‘new’. Again, we need to look at what the large web businesses such as Amazon and 
Google did that has changed the game. It wasn’t elasticity, it wasn’t automation, and it wasn’t 
virtual machines. It was a whole new way of providing and consuming information technology 
(IT). If you aren’t following that path, you aren’t building a cloud” (Bias, 2010). 
2.3. Benefits and opportunities 
Why moving to the cloud? The decision is usually composite, as there are many problems 
of traditional IT that cloud computing business model is potentially able to address. 
Customers most commonly acknowledge benefits like increased computational 
capabilities, agility, reduced time to market and cost containment, even if not all of them 
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could apply concurrently and it is necessary to pay attention to hype. Let’s review the 
main benefits and stress the opportunities. 
2.3.1 Lower barriers on entry 
“Utility Computing” (Armbrust, et al., 2009) allows exploiting computing resources in the 
same way one can draw electricity from the power grid and pay for what it has been really 
consumed. For instance, Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) charge its compute 
instances on an hourly basis and renting say a large virtual machine per 24 hours costs as 
much as renting 24 machines for one hourxiii. Of course you can reserve instances for one 
or three years and get a discount on hourly rates, but it’s not necessary. There is no 
mandatory long term commitment, no upfront cost and it is therefore possible arranging a 
running IT infrastructure much earlier compared to traditional asset purchase. This 
possibility is very attracting for private companies, but for public bodies as well, especially 
for local administrations.  
2.3.2 Elastic and reliable information system 
It may seem weird, but according to VMWare in an average datacenter most servers 
withstand only a fraction of their maximum sustainable load, typically between 5 and 
15%xiv. This is due to the fact that server population is usually shaped in order to 
withstand peak loads which can exceed the average from two to ten times (Armbrust, et 
al., 2009). Over-provisioning is the only way to avert system outages in case of unexpected 
workloads and lose immediate and potential revenues. With utility computing scaling in 
and out of theoretically unlimited resources in a matter of minutes is a provider’s task, 
whereas customer is required to arrange some clever clauses in the Service Level 
Agreement and monitor their application as much as possible. Coming to reliability, it 
must be acknowledged that a cloud provider with a sound pedigree can offer continuity-
 
26 
 
of-operation capabilities that are much superior to the ones possibly deployed by most 
organizations. Best-in-class fault tolerant systems, backups and disaster recovery policies 
can make the customer achieve availability percentages of 99.9% and more. 
2.3.3 No procurement hassle 
Buying services instead of purchasing iron means turning fixed costs for procuring and 
maintaining IT equipment (such as power or personnel) to operative costs (Etro, 2011). 
This is known as translating CapEx (Capital Expenditures, which occur to acquire or 
improve an asset and can usually be deducted during some fiscal years) into OpEx 
(Operational Expenditure, such as license fees or bills, that are needed for running the 
infrastructure and can be deducted in the same year they incurred). Some studies show 
that, on average, 65% of annual IT Capex and Opex is necessary just for managing existing 
systems, draining financial resources that could be invested on new initiatives (Milne, 
2010). Introducing new artifacts into the logistics cycle may result in an expensive and 
long journey for an organization, starting from market inquiry till assets disposal. When 
possible, avoiding procurements costs and delays can be a giant leap forward, especially 
for understaffed departments. Furthermore, shifting from CapEx to Opex may involve less 
troubles, because empowering the information system by purchasing new hardware 
usually needs a detailed planning to be presented in advance for approval, whereas 
expenditure needed for running the infrastructure are usually are taken for granted and 
authorized with less pain.  
2.3.4 Delegating IT related workload 
Notwithstanding the principle that the management of an organization is considered 
ultimately accountable for damages to people, assets and reputation resulting from 
security incidents, it holds true that many IT related workloads can be delegated with a 
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reasonable level of peace of mind if: 1) an accurate risk assessment of all valuable assets, 
including a correct identification of the security class of data have been performed; 2) a 
cloud service provider has been selected that holds certifications by reliable independent 
authorities; 3) an agreement upon an accurate SLA with provisions for properly secured 
and resilient services has been reached; 4) service quality is monitored to the maximum 
extent possible, also appointing third parties to audit provider’s security controls. 
2.3.5 Revamping old applications 
Cloud migration can help recovering versatile IT professionals permanently staffed to run 
the infrastructure and relocate them to possibly meet their expectations of new 
assignments. This may strengthen research and development teams and offers the 
opportunity to revisit exhausted legacy software that shows well known limits, but that 
maybe no one dares to tweak because of poor documentation and fear of unpredictable 
results. Instead, a ground-up rethinking of an application in a modern environment using 
best of breed development tools can make it more responsive, available and tolerant to 
peak workloads. As an example of an old application that couldn't be adapted to keep the 
pace with today’s "must have" features like ubiquitous access and social networking 
integration, consider the case of the Army Experience Center (AEC), a pilot program 
created to improve the effectiveness of recruiting operations by leveraging the new 
technologies (Kundra, 2010)b. It was clear that it was impossible to upgrade the current 
Army Recruiting Information Support System (ARISS), an over ten years old proprietary 
platform, as the Army required a customer relationship management system (CRM) 
integrated with Facebook and that could be accessed by recruiters from different clients 
including mobile devices such as notebooks, smartphones and tablets. As a new platform 
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delivered by a traditional IT vendor quoted in excess of one million dollars, the Army 
chose a customized version of a CRM tool by Salesforce.com, a SaaS cloud provider, 
fulfilling its needs at the cost of $54,000 per annum. 
2.3.6 Creating business value 
In its cloud computing strategy brief, Kurt Milne talks about “the IT Constraint Spiral” 
(Milne, 2010), meaning that IT is a natural target for funds reduction because business 
executives cannot often perceive the practical contribution of IT related activities to global 
company welfare. The return seems not proportional to spending as CIOs should exhibit 
better communications skills to explain IT capabilities to the management board. Fewer 
resources imply a diminished capacity of IT to accomplish its tasks and this unleashes a 
negative spiral that brings further shortage of funds. In order to break the spiral and make 
IT create business value, Milne says that IT must be not only cost effective, but also 
demonstrate that its spending is directly linked to company’s revenues: IT must have a 
key role in boosting business critical applications. It’s a three stage transformation 
roadmap, that includes as first and second step the virtualization of internal services (like 
file servers) and business critical applications to end with the creation of a private cloud 
where computational resources are fully virtualized and IT’s contribute is strategic to 
create new products. Leaving behind the deployment model, that might not necessarily be 
a private cloud in all situations, we can assume that cloud computing is not only a mean 
for reducing costs and reusing resources, but it can help improve business applications, 
contributing to make them more robust, responsive and available. 
The Cloud computing paradigm is perfect when considering applications that entail a 
demand of IT resources that is temporary or well localized during the month or time-
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varying with low averages or unpredictable (Armbrust, et al., 2009). Consider for example: 
1) burst mode software like weekly reports generation or wage calculations that require a 
lot of CPU power for a limited amount of time; 2) temporary projects that last for a limited 
and well known timeframe; 3) promising projects whose validity is not predictable before 
having accomplished a test bed and that could either carried on or dropped; 4) new 
organizational units such as small departments that have the chance to “start small” with 
no capital expenditure and fairly reduced IT investment. Having on-premises application 
that run on virtual machines eases cloud adoption, no matter if private or public. 
2.4. A still risky business 
The path of an incautious migration to the cloud can be fraught with downsides, 
especially for complex organizations. Moving sensitive data to someone else’s premises 
and out of our direct control recalls some understandable “ancestral fears”, for example 
about privacy, integrity and availability of information. This sums up to the fact that 
technical safeguards aren’t always as mature as they should be to grant a reasonable peace 
of mind. CC offering may be very heterogeneous, still poorly backed up by well-
established standards as to portability of data or applications and can suffer from lack of 
transparency of some commercial subjects, especially when services are operated for the 
general public. Some issues are tricky: what is the applicable jurisdiction when data cross 
state boundaries? Is there a real way to measure the performance of the Service Level 
Agreement (SLA)? What happens if the provider exits the cloud business and customers 
are trapped in proprietary applications? A conscious approach to the cloud world is a very 
serious matter for an organization as it requires that decisions are taken in several fields in 
order to factor in business, technical, legal and security aspects. Legal issues particular 
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constitute a severe hindrance at the moment as a real consensus on internationally shared 
norms concerning privacy and applicable jurisdiction is still missing and safe harbor 
agreements seem not enough to let sensitive data circulate freely. Ironically, some of the 
benefits of cloud that can represent a boon for an organization, such as disaster recovery 
capabilities, may potentially constitute its undoing. One example: replicating data across 
geographically dispersed regions increases chances of recovering from a catastrophic 
event, but can raise concerns on jurisdiction and compliancy to norms. Approaching the 
cloud is basically a risk management process, in which decision makers are requested to 
balance the costs of benefits and risks, managing the latter so that they can be well 
identified, understood and possibly reduced to an acceptable level. This implies, before 
signing a service contract, having in place a proper management framework to avert the 
occurrence of risks or at least mitigate their impact (Paquette, Jaeger and Wilson, 2010). As 
an example, in the following paragraph we will explore the case of the information 
systems of United States federal agencies, which needed a comprehensive risk 
management framework as a helping tool to minimize the issues stemming from the 
migration of services to the Cloud. 
2.4.1. The NIST Risk Management Framework 
Because of the nature of the information they handle, local and central government 
agencies must comply with precise norms to avert the risk of exposure, unauthorized 
access or unavailability of their precious estate. The United States Title III of e-
Government Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-347), namely “Federal Information Security 
Management Act” (FISMA)xv, provides an articulated framework that requires the 
adoption and enforcement of security controls about “…information collected or maintained 
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by or on behalf of the agency and information systems used or operated by an agency or by a 
contractor of an agency or other organization on behalf of an agency… ”. In this regard, the NIST 
was indicated as responsible for issuing standards and guidelines for federal information 
systems out of the competence of National Security. As a consequence, in January 2003 
NIST launched the FISMA Implementation Project to produce guidance documents aimed 
at supporting federal agencies in: 
 categorizing their information (by assigning a potential impact rate); 
 providing an adequate protection level in accordance to its value; 
 enforcing minimum security requirements in seventeen areas (such as access control, 
awareness and training, auditing and accountability, identification and authentication, 
media protection, incident response, personnel security and configuration 
management); 
 performing an effective risk assessment and management. 
NIST papers belonging to this project where published as Federal Information Processing 
Standard (FIPS) documents as well as Special Publication (SP) belonging to the 800 series. 
FIPS 199 in particular defines three levels of “potential impacts” on the interested 
organization in case of a security incident that should affect confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of data: 
 Low impact, in case of limited adverse effect (that might cause for example minor 
financial loss or little damage to people). 
 Moderate impact, in case of serious adverse effect (that might cause for example 
significant financial loss or significant harm to people, but without threats for the lives 
of individuals). 
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 High impact, in case of severe or catastrophic adverse effect (that might cause for 
example severe threat of mission fail or loss of human lives). 
Impacts rating are preliminary for assigning a security category (SC) to different 
information types. Consider the fictitious case of a federal environmental protection 
agency whose SC relative to institutional documents might be:  
SC = {(confidentiality, LOW impact), (integrity, MODERATE impact), (availability, 
MODERATE impact)} 
When rating the overall security category of an information system, it is necessary to list 
all the SCs relative to all different information types and select the highest potential impact 
or High Water Mark (HWM) for every class: confidentiality, integrity and availability. In 
the fictitious case presented, if there are different kinds of stored data whose 
confidentiality maximum potential impact is LOW, so it will be in the overall SC. The 
same applies for integrity and availability. It is worth noticing that some commercial 
Cloud Service Providers (CSP) received a FIPS199 MODERATExvi level accreditation and 
authorization from the General Service Administration. 
A fundamental document on risk management was developed by the Joint Task Force 
Transformation Initiative Interagency Working Group and published as NIST Special 
Publication 800-37 Rev.1 (The National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2010). As 
management of risk is an organization-wide activity, the paper proposes a three tiered 
approach (Figure 2.2), in which every layer normally takes inputs from the previous (even 
if more complex dynamics could see discussions at a peer level) and, going from top to 
bottom, the area of interest continuously change from strategic to tactical: 
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 Tier1 (organization level) deals with risk from an organizational point of view. Here 
an high-level risk management strategy is devised that includes the methods to assess 
all relevant security risk types (e.g. related to information systems, procurement, 
statutory compliance, legal, operations and reputation protection), the measures to 
mitigate identified threats, the definition of acceptable risk levels and monitoring; 
 at Tier 2 (mission and business process level) tasks are closely associated with Federal 
Enterprise Architecture (FEA) Reference Models (Office of Management and Budged, 
“FEA Consolidated Reference Model Document”, rel. 2.3) and Segment and Solution 
Architectures (OMB, “Federal Segment Architecture Methodology”, Jan 2009). Here a 
global information protection strategy is developed based on high-level security 
requirements, after having defined business processes, the priority of these processes 
according to organization’s goals and the type of information needed to accomplish the 
task; 
 at Tier 3 (information system level) proper management, operational and technical 
security safeguards are deployed to all relevant information systems components 
according to NIST Special Publication 800-53 Rev. 3 “Recommended Security Controls for 
Federal Information Systems and Organization”. Mostly at this level operates the Risk 
Management Framework (RMF, Figure 2.3), intended as “a disciplined and structured 
process that integrates information security and risk management activities into the system 
development life cycle”. 
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Figure 2-2 NIST Tiered Risk Management Approach 
It is important that risk related activities are performed from the beginning of the system 
development life cycle to avoid a more expensive late remediation and, in every case, 
before the information system is operative. The RMF is composed by six quasi-sequential 
stages depicted in figure 2.3 and involves many professional roles like the risk executive, 
authorizing officers, chief and senior information security officer and information security 
architects. The order of execution may be changed according to organization’s needs and 
can be interrupted by local loops as in the case of unsatisfying security controls assessment 
at step 4 that requires changes in implementation and brings back to step 3 and so forth. 
However, the last phase before putting an information system into operation must 
invariably be the acceptance of risk by an authorizing official. The process is described as 
follows: 
 Step 1: Information system categorization. According to the mission and goals of the 
organization, each subsystem of the information system is categorized according to 
FIPS199 in isolation or as an aggregate of items (like a pool of servers performing the 
same functions). This task involves all levels in the organizations, including senior 
levels like the CIO. The risk executive informs authorizing officers about organization’s 
risk strategy, dealing with aspects such as: level of risk acceptable by the organization, 
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identified threats, potential impacts on people and assets, protocols and tools used to 
evaluate the risk and proposed mitigation policy. At this point guidance is offered by 
NIST publications: FIPS 199; SP800-30, SP800-39, SP 800-59 and SP 800-60. Each 
subsystem is described and documented in the security plan by recording for example: 
location and environment, performed functions, security category of types of data 
stored and applicable norms, type and versions of operative system and applications, 
owner and entity that operates the subsystem. The main outcome of this phase is a 
detailed security categorization (low-impact, medium-impact and high-impact) of each 
piece of the information system in a way that is consistent with organization’s risk 
management strategy and protection of its mission and business. 
 Step 2: Selection of security controls. Based on the identified security category of an 
information system, security controls are selected according to a baseline pool (low, 
medium and high) as described in NIST SP 800-53 Rev3. Controls belong to 18 families 
(17 described in FIPS 200 as minimum security requirements plus Program 
Management) organized in 3 classes (Technical, Operational and Management). 
Controls families deal with: access control, auditing and accountability, identification 
and authentication, incident response and personnel security just to cite a few. Further 
controls can be chosen to tailor specific organization needs and everything is recorded 
in the security plan including the reasons for selection. When services are outsourced, 
description of how these are protected by the external entity is produced and assurance 
is obtained concerning an acceptable level of protection and risk management by the 
provider. Relevant documentation is provided by NIST publications: FIPS 199, FIPS 
200, SP800-30 and SP800-53. At this stage, a monitoring strategy at a predefined 
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frequency of the chosen security controls is agreed upon that includes an effective 
configuration management and control scheme. At the end of this step, proper security 
controls, monitoring program and authorizing officials are identified. The security plan 
is reviewed and approved.  
 
Figure 2-3 The NIST Risk Management Framework 
 Step 3: Implementation of security controls. Protection controls are deployed to the 
proper subsystems and the security documentation is updated accordingly. Products 
should be used (e.g. antivirus or intrusion detection and prevention systems) that offer, 
if possible, a sound effectiveness pedigree after being approved by trusted third-party 
laboratories. When applicable, an information assurance activity is carried on to 
ascertain the quality of products such as design and development. Guidance: FIPS 200, 
SP800-30, SP800-53 and SP800-53A.  
 Step 4: Assessment of security controls.  An assessment plan with targets, procedures 
and tools is designed and approved. Assessing individuals or organizations are 
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appointed that offer the necessary level of skill, independence and confidentiality. 
Assessment operations are performed and reported. Remediation activities requested 
to address the most important weakness of controls are executed, toggling from step 3 
to step 4 as necessary. Guidance: SP800-30 and SP800-53A. 
 Step 5: Authorization of the information system. At this point authorizing officials 
can take their risk based decisions counting on strategic information delivered by risk 
executive at step 1 and having a security authorization package prepared by the 
information system owner, which contains the security plan, the assessment report and 
the plan of action ad milestones. This last document contains a detailed descriptions of the 
actions needed to remediate the flaws detected during assessment and a schedule with 
milestones within which problems will be solved. It is important to underline that, in 
case of security controls provided by external providers, authorizing officials’ decision 
is based on information presented by the provider. The final authorization decision 
document indicates whether or not the information system got the permission to 
operate, along with terms, conditions and deadline of authorization. Guidance: SP800-
30 and SP800-53A. 
 Step 6: Monitoring security controls. As configuration changes are routinely applied 
to information systems, it is fundamental having in place a proper policy to track and 
document variations of hardware and software setups. Ongoing security control 
monitoring is needed to evaluate the potential impact of changes on security (for 
example the exposure to new threats or application of new controls) and keep 
authorization level as time goes on. Monitoring activity generates a report to the 
authorizing authorities that can be event driven or scheduled or both. As a 
 
38 
 
consequence, the assessment report is updated and so is the plan of action ad 
milestones when remediation is applied. Risk is therefore continuously evaluated and 
accepted. Guidance: SP800-30, SP800-53 and SP800-53A. 
2.4.2. Risks and concerns 
In the following, we are going to review the key factors to be considered in the evaluation 
of the overall risk of migrating to cloud services. Not each and every item could be 
applicable for every case, but the forthcoming list is comprehensive enough to cover most 
situations. 
2.4.2.1 Loss of control 
Perhaps the first unpleasant thinking which arises in the mind of cloud suspicious people 
is the perspective of being not the only master of data anymore. The circumstance of 
yielding a significant slice of sovereignty to some third party can be daunting. This is 
understandable because, even if a service level agreement is in place, doubts may arise 
concerning its efficacy and the possibility to monitor its real effects. Standard contracts are 
usually biased in favor of providers and laid down on a “take it or leave it” basis. A few 
customers will have the strength to contract clauses which states CSP accountability if 
sensitive data is exposed or lost. In this respect, the Public Sector can play an important 
role in fostering cloud technology adoption, as it happened for Internet wide acceptance 
and diffusion, thanks to its vast economic capacity (Allison and Capretz, 2011). 
Government organizations are in the position to achieve favorable conditions by setting 
forth contract vehicles and certification programs for providers that could be viable tools 
for the private sector too. For example, by massively purchasing email or office 
productivity services from SaaS providers that qualify after a remarkable path of scrutiny, 
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the PS could be crucial to further lower prices, create case studies and convince private 
enterprises to do the same. 
2.4.2.2 Value concentration 
Cloud infrastructures are much like banks: they keep potentially extremely valuable 
information belonging to a large number of customers. This value concentration may 
make them a desirable target for any sort of cyber criminals as well as malicious insiders 
that could be tempted to break their vows of allegiance to their employer. As a part of 
their security policy and as permitted by law, well structured providers usually 
accomplish a scrutiny of the background of their employees which is proportional to their 
level of clearance. They also have in place an identity management system which audits all 
operations on customers' records and grants necessary privileges to relevant people only. 
After all, when a security incident occurs, a CSP may suffer no lesser damages than its 
users in terms of reputation and will strive to avoid security breaches. Nevertheless, any 
who owns some experience in running IT systems knows how difficult can be protecting 
from a bent system administrator, even if this holds true also when data reside in 
customer's house.  
2.4.2.3 Physical security 
From a cloud provider’s perspective, while costs for purchasing hardware and software 
can be balanced by the profits of serving many customers, the expenditure for physical 
security represents a rather important fixed cost that someone might overly wish to limit. 
When information systems move to the cloud, a detailed evaluation of the physical and 
environmental security of provider’s premises should accompany the assessment of IT 
security controls and business continuity policy. This is to ensure that equipment is 
physically protected, as the provider claims, by adequate measures like inconspicuous 
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facilities, armed guards, armored rooms, video surveillance, alarms, biometric access 
control, visitors screening, power continuity, air cooling and fire protection. Despite this is 
situation is not new as it is typical of outsourcing, the foreseeable increase in cloud 
services adoption may exacerbate the problem. 
2.4.2.4 IT Security 
Cloud infrastructures are complex ecosystems which entail a huge degree of software 
layers possibly plagued by coding and configuration flaws which may pave the way to 
cyber attacks. As discussed in par. 2.1.1, resources are pooled among many customers and 
an isolation of domains is enforced that could be possibly bypassed by other malicious 
tenants in case of security vulnerabilities. Exposure to risks much depends from cloud 
service and deployment models: passing from SaaS to IaaS responsibility of securing 
platform gradually shifts from provider to customer. A possible threat model assumes that 
in a private/community deployment the computing environment is trusted and no harm 
can come from insiders and other tenants, till the time comes when a connection to a 
public network is operated. In a public cloud scenario this may change a lot, but this much 
depends on the chosen commercial partner: reliable operators can count on dedicated IT 
security teams, deploy detection points, analyze traffic for suspicious activity and prevents 
customers from probing other people's network connections. On the average, this may 
largely surpass the security measures that could be reasonably devised in a private 
corporate network and once again stresses the concept that migrating to cloud services 
needs to be a multi faceted informed decision. 
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2.4.2.5 Lock-in 
One finds himself trapped in a cloud solution when it is not economically or technically 
feasible to switch to another supplier. This is a major point that many are happy to 
overlook until it's too late. Cloud offers still feature a large degree of proprietary solutions 
ranging from data formats, development libraries or interfaces and up to procedures. This 
is why it vital to consider in the first place the business impact, stemming for example 
from porting our flagship applications, should we decide to move away. The presence in 
the contract of some clauses concerning, among others, a painless export of data in a 
standard or well documented format is of paramount importance. When customers' 
records are stored in a format that comply with an international standard or at least at a 
well known or anyhow documented industry template, moving those data from one cloud 
provider to another may require much lesser effort. The same is true for applications, 
which can be run in both environments without the need to be coded again. Portability is 
achieved by removing dependencies on the underlying environment (Chetal, et al., 2011). 
In a well designed risk plan, portability issues must be faced since the beginning, as it is 
necessary to consider that the cloud provider one day could change and prepare the 
ground for a data transfer-back that is as smooth as possible. This means avoiding to be 
locked in proprietary material or at least include a proper clause to export data in a 
portable format. As it is cloud customers’ common practice paying little or no attention to 
portability until they need to get their data back, Googlexvii advices people to ask these 
three simple questions before using an application that will store their data: 1) Can I get my 
data out in an open, interoperable, portable format? 2) How much is it going to cost to get my data 
out? 3) How much of my time is it going to take to get my data out? The ideal answers should 
be: 1) Yes. 2) Nothing more than I'm already paying. 3) As little as possible. 
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Indeed, portability issues have always existed and that is why programmers adopt 
languages like Java that are operative system (OS) agnostic or adapt code to the 
underlying OS by mean of conditional compilation. Cloud models may exacerbate the 
problem however, because software platforms are not owned, but rather are delivered as a 
service whose cost/quality relationship could be unsatisfying over time. Lack of 
portability is a limiting factor for cloud diffusion not only in the case the organization 
decided to switch to another public cloud provider, but also if it wanted to move legacy 
applications to the cloud. Indeed, even if the software were written using a high level 
language like Java or C#, a large degree of code modifications may be necessary because 
cloud resources are possibly invoked by means programming interfaces that have many of 
proprietary extensions. 
2.4.2.6 Troubles in ensuring an on premises-like protection 
Leaving aside the case of on-premises private cloud, RMF’s application can be challenging 
when cloud computing services come into play, because information systems are operated 
outside the security perimeter of the organization. This further degree of risk must 
therefore be addressed with additional security actions directed to ensure confidentiality, 
availability and integrity. For example, cloud providers can be contractually bound to 
implement all steps from 1 to 4 of the RMF (step 5 will mandatorily be an exclusive 
prerogative of the buying organization) and in the SLA all necessary security controls can 
be detailed. However, when the possibility to effectively assess those controls and monitor 
them continuously were practically denied, authorizing officials would indeed be forced 
to base their decision on papers and on trust of provider’s reputation. This problem is real 
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because verifying CSP actions like storage media sanitization before disposal or effective 
data confinement in the right geographical region could be very hard, if not impossible. 
2.4.2.7 Data location and reachability 
It is likely that data stored in a cloud provider facility cannot cross national boundaries, 
otherwise issues related to jurisdiction may arise. This is by law. So it is simply not 
feasible, from a legal point of view, replicating cloud data to other regions out of the 
borders and a proper SLA clause will state this in bold capital letters. All well then? Not 
quite. Even so, less tangible dynamics may cause data to leak out. Consider the case of a 
cloud provider headquartered in country A, but operating also in country B with a 
subsidiary company, that could be in the position to silently hand over data residing in 
datacenters of country B to law enforcement or intelligence agencies of country A. This 
situation is less theoretical than it could sound. For example, there is some concern in the 
EU, because U.S. headquartered cloud companies cannot possibly refuse to disclose 
privacy sensitive data physically located in European facilities to U.S. authorities under 
the USA Patriot Actxviii. Ensuring that under no circumstances cloud providers will make 
data reachable to foreign countries is of utmost importance. 
2.4.2.8 Data sanitization 
As discussed, one of the advantages of turning to an external provider is avoiding the 
burden ICT procurement and the associated costs for decommissioning storage devices. A 
fundamental task to protect valuable institutional data is performing an assessment of 
provider’s policy and techniques to clear, purge and destroy working and backup media 
before disposal according to best practices (such as NIST Special Publication 800-88). If 
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applicable and technically possible, using strong encryption algorithms would save a lot 
of worries concerning the effective enforcement of sanitization methods. 
2.4.2.9 Need of specialized security personnel 
Complying with norms and regulations, like the ones implemented in the NIST SP800-37 
RMF, could be difficult for an organization willing to rely on external cloud services, 
especially for small departments. Several risk management and security functions are 
needed that cannot be easily collapsed on a few employees: risk executive, authorizing 
officer, chief and senior information security officer, enterprise architect, information 
security architect, just to recall some. External security professionals can be contracted for 
this purpose, but we think that the availability of contract templates, like the ones devised 
by some countries like USA or Great Britain for the public sector, would be very helpful to 
reduce risk management burden. 
2.5. Further discussion 
2.5.1. Which deployment model? 
If properly implemented, public clouds have all the potential to store information as safely 
as private data centers, if not more in some cases. Nevertheless, it is worth keeping in 
mind that public clouds are managed by commercial parties that sell their computational 
resources to the general public and there are situations in which it is necessary to turn to 
private clouds or even abandon the will to migrate, maybe limiting to server consolidation 
activities only. Preliminary risks assessment may bring to discard a public cloud solution 
due to: 
 provider incapability to guarantee an acceptable level of confidentiality, availability 
and integrity in relation to the nature of data. Despite nothing forbids a commercial 
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provider to setup a facility  with military-grade security, it might be impossible for a 
police force to entrust investigative records; 
 the amount of information involved (Misra and Mondal, 2010). If an organization 
regularly deals with a huge quantity of data, like science or cartographic laboratories, 
pushing that data to the cloud within the due timeframe may imply relevant costs for 
bandwidth and storage; 
 the quality of service required (Misra and Mondal, 2010): real time services require 
specifying very stringent SLA clauses that could not be possible or worthy to accept by 
a cloud provider.  Quite some time will need to pass before seeing a Paas application 
for air traffic control delivered on a platform of a commercial party. 
When a private cloud can be the only viable solution, it is better keeping in mind that 
behaving like a profitable provider implies all the costs of ownership for procuring, 
licensing and operating the data center. The need to enlarge the user base to keep an 
excellent information system’s utilization can then address towards community 
computing. Different organizations may decide to come together and deploy a community 
cloud solution that could fit their common exigencies. In the case of the Public Sector, a 
central agency could deliver services to an entire department or to bodies belonging to the 
same business area. One example is the U.S. Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) 
Computer Services Directorate (CSD) that supports the Department of Defense (DoD) in 
the Information Technology area. DISA created a private cloud infrastructure named 
Rapid Access Computing Environment (RACE)xix, a IaaS platform that allows all Defense 
actors to purchase virtual machine services by mean of a self service storefront, in order to 
test and certificate software packages for acceptance to Defense Enterprise Computing 
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Center production environment. Hybrid cloud deployments could be another possible 
solution. Consider the case in which an organization owns a private cloud that is designed 
to handle the average load, but is under-provisioned to withstand occasional demand 
surges (cloudbursting). Peak traffic can be managed by launching as many as necessary 
instances located in the provider’s premises and stopping them when exigency ends. If 
peaks occurrence is a relatively rare event, this setup guaranties performance and 
availability of applications at a little extra cost. Hybrid computing is also valuable in case 
of huge amount of data coming from different sources, which contains a lot of irrelevant 
noise that can be filtered greatly in house before being pushed to the public cloud for 
further analysis, consolidation and presentation to consumers.   
2.5.2. Which service model?  
The message is: “More control, more responsibilities”, which means that the level of 
abstraction drops when moving from SaaS to IaaS and a greater degree of control and 
responsibilities is transferred from the provider (see fig.2.4). 
 
Figure 2-4 User responsibility growth from Saas to Iaas 
SaaS and PaaS are perfect as they allow an organization to focus on its core business, 
without caring about the low level plumbing of information system’s maintenance. At 
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SaaS level users are relieved from any trouble concerning security or compliancy, but get 
prepackaged software that could cover only a part of their business needs and may have 
little or no capacity to influence fundamental aspects like data formats or protection 
techniques (at most they can ask for a customized version). With Paas customers are in 
charge to correct vulnerabilities introduced by design flaws or coding errors and 
configuration weaknesses caused by improper management of authentication or privileges 
(Mather, Kumaraswamy and Latif, 2009). Furthermore, the issues on application 
portability due to proprietary APIs must be considered. IaaS gives a large degree of 
flexibility, but provider takes care from the physical security of the infrastructure just up 
to the Virtual Machine Monitorxx (VMM). Customers have full administrative rights 
granted for the virtual machines they run and therefore are completely responsible for 
keeping safe and sound the entire software chain, from the guest OS to final user’s 
application software. For organizations that have already started a server consolidation 
path, turning to a IaaS private or public solution can be  almost straightforward as cloud 
providers usually give the possibility to import to their infrastructure customer’s VM in 
the most widespread format. This way legacy software that could be difficult to upgrade 
or adapt to Paas environments might seamlessly run in the cloud, provided that all 
interdependence with other applications and services has been assessed in advance. 
2.5.3. How is it possible to mitigate portability and interoperability issues? 
Despite lack of portability is still viewed as limiting factor of cloud spread and there is 
much work ahead, it must be acknowledged that many efforts towards portability and 
interoperability were made in recent years. The following is by no means a comprehensive 
gallery of initiatives: 
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 the Open Virtualization Format (OVF) is an open standard, secure and portable format 
to package and distribute virtual machines (Distributed Management Task Force, 
2010). It has been designed for platform neutrality, which means that virtual machine 
files in OVF format can be ported from one IaaS provider to another without 
modification. Furthermore, OVF has many important features as it allows the 
following and more: package efficiently a complex environment made of one or many 
interdependent VMs, verify integrity and authenticity of the package by mean of 
digests and digital signatures, specify all details of the virtual hardware (like CPU or 
memory) and host relevant metadata (like virtual disk information, logical networks or 
license agreement for the software in the package). 
 OpenStack is a community project started by Rackspace and NASA to build massively 
scalable IaaS clouds that could be viable for building private or community cloud 
solutions. OpenStack addresses cloud infrastructures interoperability by leveraging 
open source and open standard. It consists of three subprojects named: 1) Nova, an 
hypervisor-agnostic fabric controller to run and manage virtual machines networks; 2) 
Swift, a distributed store for objects like virtual machine images or pictures that can 
scale to petabytes (one petabyte is around one million of gigabytes) and achieves fault 
tolerance by replicating data across multiple cluster nodes made of commodity 
hardware. Unlike file systems items that can have byte granularity, Swift objects are 
atomic in nature, meaning that to be updated, an object needs to be deleted and 
uploaded again (more on this in chapter 4); 3) Glance, a service for register, discover 
and deliver virtual machine images via standard interfaces. The whole infrastructure is 
orchestrated by mean of authenticated web services which expose control of 
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hypervisor, storage and networking. The application interfaces are compatible with 
tools already used by commercial vendors and this paves the way to portability or 
hybrid cloud solutions, when applicable. More projects were added over time, for 
instance to manage network addresses and routing configurations or block storage 
which cloud be attached as volumes to virtual machines.  
 In April 2011 the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers have created two 
working groups named IEEE P2301xxi and 2302xxii. The former will develop a Guide for 
Cloud Portability and Interoperability Profiles (CPIP) to support cloud vendors, 
providers and developers to converge towards standardized application interfaces and 
file formats organized in groups of capabilities called profiles. The latter will focus on 
standards for Intercloud Interoperability and Federation (SIIF) to allow different cloud 
infrastructures to federate and interoperate. 
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3. CLOUD COMPUTING NATIONAL STRATEGIES 
The foreseeable advantages of the cloud revolution are so promising that national or 
super-national migration plans are sprouting all over the world. This was also due to the 
consideration that some agencies in the public sector were already using cloud 
technologies as a “de facto” service, possibly threatening the overall information assurance 
level. So it was much more fruitful taking note of the situation and organize a coordinated, 
thoughtful and risk conscious approach that could give guidance and support to all 
stakeholders. During the whole preparation period, the cooperation amongst 
Governments, specialized public agencies, industry, academia and professionals was 
fostered in order to deliver an evaluation framework not only to policy and decision 
makers of Member States and public administrations, but also to small & medium 
business enterprises (SMEs) CIOs. These comprehensive policy documents, enriched with 
fictitious use cases and complete with ancillary technical specifications, usually cover the 
following areas: a clear statement of needs and requirements according to organization’s 
mission, the jurisdictional and legal context with related implications and limitations, 
guidelines for a rigorous risk assessment, identification of applications eligible for 
migration and hints for the choice of a service (SaaS, PaaS, IaaS) or deployment model 
(private, community or public). In the following, we will deal with strategies of the 
European Commission, United Kingdom, United States and Australia. 
3.1. European Commission 
A lot of work has been done in the recent years to prepare the ground with solid 
recommendations for a wise adoption of a cloud computing strategy in EU member states 
(MS). The European Network and Information Security Agency released a report (The 
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European Network and Information Security Agency, 2011) aimed at helping government 
organizations to better scrutinize their needs (with particular attention to information 
security) and choose the best cloud deployment platform accordingly (public, private, 
community or hybrid). Practical use cases are discussed, with local administration and 
central government scenarios. The paper acknowledges the benefits stemming from public 
cloud providers in term of cost-effectiveness and resiliency, but regulatory issues advice 
limiting to non sensitive data and not critical applications. In this latter case, private or 
community infrastructure should be selected, if the requirement of adequate scale is 
fulfilled. Conclusions are in favor of a staged approach to cloud computing services as 
they match most of the requirements of public administrations, provided that managers at 
all levels undertake a thorough process for assessing the impact of all possible risks to 
processes and applications: loss of control, lack of compliance to laws and regulations and 
poor network connectivity in some residual areas of Europe, just to recall a few. An 
evaluation of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats, known as SWOT analysis 
(Böhm, 2013), must be considered as bare minimum and must be completed with a 
security assessment as detailed in a previous paper (The European Network and 
Information Security Agency, 2009). At the World Economic Forum held in Davos in 
January 2011xxiii Neelie Kroes, Vice-President of the European Commission and 
responsible for the Digital Agendaxxiv, while acknowledging the role of cloud computing 
as service model potentially able to change the very meaning of making business in the 
modern enterprise, announced an EU-wide strategy based on the following pillars: 
 Legal framework: revision of EU data protection directivexxv , in particular concerning: 
 “the right to be forgotten”, which entails new and revisited prescriptions to grant an 
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individual an effective right to withdraw consent to its personal data storage; 
 “greater transparency”, about the nature and purpose of collected data; 
 “privacy by default”, according to which protection remains even if the reason of 
processing data changes; 
 “data location invariance”, so that EU laws apply to services consumed from EU 
member states territories, disregarding the geographical location of the data 
processor. 
 Technical and commercial fundamentals: strong focus on information security, 
standardization of software interfaces and data formats, design of sample contracts 
and SLA between parties. 
 Market: the Commission will partner with Member States (MS) to support innovative 
projects targeted to cloud platforms. 
In May 2011, the European Commission launched a public consultation on cloud 
computing looking for opinions from companies, public administrations, academics and 
individuals concerning users experience, visions, opportunities and threats. The main 
outcomes of the consultationxxvi showed a large degree of legal uncertainty in cross border 
data transfers where it is not so clear which kind of jurisdiction applies. Consequently, the 
acknowledged need of more information on rights and duties welcomes any decision 
support tool like guidelines, checklists and standard clauses for service level and end user 
agreements. Provided that these clauses are simple to understand and clear in their 
wording, they could be usefully integrated in the final contract, especially within the EU. 
Surprisingly, respondents were largely divided about the trumpeted non homogeneous 
implementation at national level of the EU privacy directive which, according to the 
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providers opinion, severely hampers a widespread cloud adoption. Furthermore, it turns 
out a general acceptance of the global nature of the cloud computing that would require a 
broad discussion concerning information transfer and treatment at the highest levels such 
as the G20. Finally, the need for a stronger research effort is widely recognized, especially 
in the area of time critical applications or hybrid cloud platforms management. Relying on 
this survey, in September 2012 the Commission issued a formal strategy document, 
namely 'Unleashing the Potential of Cloud Computing in Europe'xxvii , whose target is 
facilitating the adoption of CC in all sector of EU economy to cause by 2020 an overall 
impact on European gross domestic product (GDP) of about 1000 billion Euros and a 
consequential creation of nearly 4 million of new jobs. 
3.2. UK G-Cloud 
Definitely inspired by the U.S. "cloud first policy" (to be discussed next), in October 2011 
the UK Cabinet Office released a document named "Government Cloud Strategy"xxviii (G-
Cloud) as part of a wider ICT reorganization programxxix , aimed at delivering better 
services for the public at a lesser cost. Accomplishment of this target is feasible thanks to a 
greater efficiency obtained with the creation of a common standard based ICT 
infrastructure that allows resource sharing and reuse. The scope of this pioneering project 
is vast and ambitious as it is directed to save nearly 1.4 billion pounds during a four years 
period. This would be possible mainly by creating a more competitive, transparent and 
oligopolies-rid marketplace where all players will have the same opportunities to access 
procurement tenders, by reviewing of the most expensive ICT projects and by posing 
increased reliance on the expertise of internal workforce at the expense of external 
consultants. The G-Cloud program rests on the smart consideration that public cloud 
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services, based on the concepts of scalability and pay per use, can be a flexible and cost 
effective first choice for many organizations of the PS, which often do not need costly 
bespoke ICT solutions when low cost mass market products can be leveraged with little or 
no customizations. G-Cloud services can be consumed from a private Government 
infrastructure as well as from trusted commercial providers that offer proper warranties in 
terms of information assurance. Hybrid scenarios are admissible too. Central to the 
realization of this strategy is the CloudStorexxx, a online storefront open for business as of 
2012, where public bodies can procure storage, applications, infrastructures and 
professional services by querying a catalog that reports service description, features, 
associated costs and business impact levels (BIL). Services implementation can vary 
greatly. For instance, a commodity hardware private cloud can be installed by the CSP on 
the customer's premises while retaining an "as a service" billing or deployed within CSP 
data centers located in the UK. When the sensitivity of data forbids turning to any 
commercial party whatsoever, the strategy states that the government may rely on its data 
center estate that, after a rationalization and consolidation phase, should remarkably 
improve its average utilization thanks to an increased asset sharing. Anyway, it holds firm 
the principle that each public body is ultimately responsible for the risks stemming from 
moving or creating its data in the cloud. Assigning a security category to the data it owns 
and choosing a cloud service with an appropriate impact level is a prerogative of each 
information owner, who must purchase a service suitable to information assurance needs. 
That is why a pan government CSP accreditation servicexxxi carried out by the UK 
CESGxxxii  (Communications-Electronics Security Group, a Government division that deals 
with information assurance) has been devised as a support tool with the goal of approving 
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once to reuse the same service many times across the PS. For completeness sake, it has to 
be reported that the G-Cloud program faced some alleged problems at its inception that 
seemed to cause its cancellation. However, it is fully operational now (April 2014) and 
must be considered an ongoing effort that will probably converge to full maturity only 
iteratively. Indeed, it stands as a bright and tangible example of grasping the 
opportunities of innovation at the largest scale and particularly laudable is the 
commitment to transparency as suppliers are requested to provide reports of all invoices 
for procured services which are published every monthxxxiii. Analysis of these raw dataxxxiv 
shows that from 2012 to the end of February 2014 a total amount of 124 million pounds 
have been spent in 7558 transactions for procuring Infrastructures (Lot 1), Platforms (Lot 
2), Software (Lot 3) or Professional Services (Lot 4). In this respect, it has to be noted that 
some spending is zero and some is negative possibly because they stem from 
compensations operated with suppliers for amounts already paid by some 
Administration. Therefore, if we anyhow consider all expenditures positive to evaluate the 
total value of cloud services we reach an amount close to 128 million. Compared to large 
companies, SMEs have been awarded of 59% of total sales by value and 58% by volume. 
The Central Government accounts for 78% of total sales by value operated by the PS. Table 
3.1 reports the value of cloud services from 2012 up to the end of February 2014: 
 2012 2013 2014 (up to Feb) 
Total value £ 7,125,014.52 £ 89,801,190.69 £ 30,787,950.53 
Average spend £12,521.99 £17,379.75 £16,897.89 
Num of transact. 569 5,167 1,822 
Min spend £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 
Max spend £470,000.00 £800,000.00 £437,025.00 
Std Deviation £27,758.79 £40,599.83 £41,300.76 
Table 3-1 G-Cloud services statistics from 2012 to 2014 
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Table 3.1 shows that compared to 2012, very first year of business of the CloudStore, 
during 2013 there has seen a vertical rise of the demand of cloud services both in value 
(nearly 90 million pounds compared to 7) and in volume (5,167 transactions compared to 
569). The upward trend seems confirmed because just in the first two months of 2014 
about one third of the value and volume of 2013 has already been produced. Partitioning 
the total value of transactions into lots as shown in table 3.2, it can been seen that there is a 
preponderance of professional services which accounted for more than 79% in 2013 and 
exceeded 80% in 2014. Software weighted for a gratifying 15% in 2013, which reduced to 
10% in 2014 for the benefit of Infrastructures which doubled their importance, passing 
from 4.44% to 8.46% in 2014. Platform as a service turnover is almost negligible (less than 
1%). 
 
2012 2013 2014 (up to Feb) 
 
Value 
Lot 1 3.74% 4.44% 8.46% 
Lot 2 2.96% 0.91% 0.85% 
Lot 3 30.39% 15.26% 9.98% 
Lot 4 62.91% 79.39% 80.70% 
 
Volume 
Lot 1 104 661 332 
Lot 2 53 101 23 
Lot 3 140 848 267 
Lot 4 272 3,557 1,200 
Table 3-2 G-Cloud services partitioning into lots 
To determine whether this trend will possibly continue during 2014 or if there is 
meaningful probability that this distribution of purchases into lots will be different, we 
applied a chi-square goodness of fit test to a randomly selected pool of 200 purchases 
performed during 2014 (observed counts in table 3.3) with a degree of freedom equal to 3 
(the number of lots minus one). The null hypothesis will be that there is no difference 
among distribution into lots compared to 2013 as offsets between observed and expected 
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values are only due to chance. The expected frequency is the number of purchases for each 
lot divided by the total volume produced during 2013 (e.g. for IaaS 661/5.167 corresponds 
to 12.79 %). Table 3.3 shows test findings: 
Lot Exp. freq Norm.Exp.Count Obs. count (O-
E)^2/E 
 
1 12.79% 25.59 40 8.12  
2   1.95% 3.91 6 1.12  
3 16.41% 32.82 27 1.03  
4 68.84% 137.68 127 0.83  
Total 100.00% 200 200 11.10 χ² 
Table 3-3 Chi-square goodness of fit test results 
Choosing a confidence level of 0.05 or less, it can be calculated that a chi-square value of 
11.10 corresponds to a p-value of 0.0112 which makes us reject the null hypothesis and 
conclude that it is reasonable to expect that distribution of lots will be different during 
2014. 
3.3. United States 
In a pivotal paper (Kundra, 2010)a, Federal CIO Vivek Kundra listed the top 25 priorities 
to reform Federal IT. Drivers for change are solid: 
 projects that exceed budgets and fail to achieve the expected results with detrimental 
consequences for the service due to the public; 
 a galaxy of proprietary, locally managed systems that need a considerable amount of 
time and money to be provisioned and are largely underutilized (by less of 30% of 
server capacity). 
Point 3 in particular, namely “cloud first policy” (CFP), has the purpose of engaging 
agencies CIOs in selecting three “must move” applications to be ported to public or 
private cloud platforms as appropriate. The first migration needed to be accomplished 
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within 12 month and the remaining two within further 6 months, after having devised a 
detailed risk analysis plan. Meanwhile, a federal cloud computing strategy was put on 
paper (Kundra, 2011). The document reported that an estimated amount of 20 billion 
dollars, corresponding to the 25% of the overall Federal Government IT expenditure, 
could be potentially converted into CC services: this would result in 30% savings only for 
data center infrastructure that could be usefully repurposed. This well justified an 
articulated guide to support public administrators in grasping the benefits of the cloud: 
better asset utilization, lower maintenance costs, improved capacity to withstand IT 
resources demand peaks and increased agility in starting new programs with quick 
evaluation of projects feasibility (the “start small” approach). Since migration required a 
significant mentality change, shifting the view from assets to services, from risk adverse 
culture to an entrepreneurial approach, Kundra’s vision delivered also a decision 
framework based on three pillars: “select, provision, manage”. First movers needed to be 
services that concurrently exhibit a high degree of “value” and “readiness”. A high value 
service, if moved to the cloud, allows achieving the best improvement of at least one 
among agility, efficiency and innovation. Underutilized applications, whose maintenance 
is difficult and costly, are an example of valuable assets in this respect. The term readiness 
is composite. An application can be deemed ready for migration when agencies have 
verified, according to their missions and compatibly with their capabilities to contract 
successfully, that one or more of the following requirements have been fulfilled: 
 public or government provider’s trustfulness in terms of compliancy to laws and 
agency’s information processing standards adopted under the provisions of FISMA, 
event auditing and vulnerability assessments, confidentiality and integrity. To facilitate 
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agencies decisions, the GSA (General Service Administration) initially identified 
reliable service providers that, after a comprehensive assessment and authorization 
program in accordance with NIST Special Publications 800-37 and 800-53 (rev 3), met 
all security requirements at FISMA’s Moderate Impact Data security level. These 
operators were granted an Authority to Operate (ATO) on IaaS Blanket Purchase 
Agreement (BPA) and could sell storage, virtual machines and web hosting through 
the cio.govxxxv portal. This accreditation process has been further finalized in the 
Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP)xxxvi, whose target is 
providing a standard and reusable approach to security assessment, authorization and 
monitoring for government and commercial cloud computing services. To achieve a 
provisional ATO issued by the Joint Authorization Board (JAB), an authority whose 
members are the CIOs of Department of Homeland Security (DHS), GSA and 
Department of Defence (DoD), a cloud provider must initiate from scratch a security 
assessment process compliant with NIST Special Publications 800-37 and 800-53 (rev 3). 
This process aims at selecting the appropriate physical/logical security controls (such 
as a biometric access control system or a firewall) and finally implementing and 
assessing these controls. All this activity is documented in an security package 
containing, as a minimum, a security plan and an assessment report. The CSP then 
contacts a government accredited "Third Party Organization" (3PAO) to independently 
verify the package. If all goes well, the package is submitted to the JAB and, if a 
provisional authorization is  granted, it is inserted in a shared repository so that each 
agency can use it as a baseline to issue its own Authorization to Operate (ATO), adding 
additional controls, if necessary. This authorization path can be also started by an 
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agency if the security package was not previously present in the repository. This “do 
once, use many times” behavior saves time and money because agencies will likely rely 
on a baseline of already granted government-wide authorizations and take care of their 
specific requirements only, if any; 
 provider’s continuity of Operations (COOP) capacity. This could be endangered by a 
plethora of reasons including provider’s end of business, natural disasters or man 
crafted attacks; 
 maturity of the provider’s offering and adherence to standards, to minimize lock-in 
issues; 
 level of obsolescence: applications that needs to be revamped with new functions or 
that suffer in performances because of exhausted hardware are to receive a higher 
priority than others that were recently revised; 
 suitability of legacy assets to migration: a well documented software that has little and 
clear interactions with other applications is a better candidate than one that 
accumulated layers of cryptic changes over the years and could exhibit an 
unpredictable behavior once removed from its usual environment. 
The last part of the decision framework section reported recommendations concerning: 
 an effective capacity of agencies to sign successful contracts with providers by putting 
on paper a Service Level Agreements (SLA) granting a prompt, secure and resilient 
service, with a specific clause that enables an independent third-party assessment of 
provider’s security controls. Contracts needed to be monitored for SLA compliancy 
and providers held accountable for service underperformance or disruption. SLA is an 
output metric that forces a mindset shift from assets to services. 
 
61 
 
 re-evaluation of the Quality of Service (QoS) delivered by the providers whose 
motivation needs to be kept alive by mean of periodical competitive bids. This requires 
that CIOs and their staff be always up to date about market developments.    
As a final remark, it is worth noticing that the large body of directives of the American 
strategy points in the right direction to implement a quantum shifts in the ICT-mediated 
relationship between the American public sector and taxpayers. We did not expect 
anything less in the land of the pioneers of the cloud. The revolution is underway and 
appears irreversible, even if a huge cultural and organizational effort will still be 
necessary. Managers at all levels will need to be motivated and encouraged to further 
develop their expertise and entrepreneurial culture. It is known that all over the world 
some areas of the public sector are reluctant to changes as they don’t want to endanger 
their stable position facing the associated risks. Here a degree of external guidance and 
control is necessary, but it seems not enough to achieve the desired results. What is 
needed is also a substantial endogenous spur, a drive stemming from the awareness of 
being part of a much larger project than the individual as the final prize is a greener, more 
agile, more reliable and citizen friendly public administration. According to Allen et al. 
(Allen, et al., 2004) the use of IT as a strategic instrument to better serve the public, instead 
of being a trivial tool to accomplish every day office tasks, depends on the organization of 
government agencies. They showed that a traditional rigid hierarchical structure inhibits 
the necessary horizontal collaboration and information sharing among departments. 
There are some hurdles to overtake. For example, one of the consequences of purchasing 
computing power as a utility is that public managers will have to show a great capacity to 
negotiate profitable SLAs with contractors as now a complex service is delivered whereas 
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once there was only internally managed bare metal. As previously discussed, standard 
contracts are usually biased in favor of providers. In what extent they will accept to be 
held accountable if sensitive data is exposed or lost needs to be agreed upon. The presence 
of some clauses could be vital to enhance security and avoid as much as possible the risks 
of lock-in: encryption methods for data in transit and at rest, free takeout of information in 
a standard or well documented format when contract expires and a documented list of 
possible third parties involved in service delivery. Anyway, U.S. public sector has the 
critical mass to achieve favorable conditions and, once more, pave the way for many other 
public bodies all over the world. 
3.4. Australia 
The demand of public bodies for flexible, cost-effective and performing services is 
increasing in Australia, a nation that poses much reliance on ICT and records an annual 
Government’s expense of 4.3 billion dollars. The cloud computing strategic direction 
paperxxxvii aimed at giving guidance in evaluating opportunities and risks, but showed a 
more neutral view of the cloud than other countries, when it states that“…cloud computing 
is just one of many sourcing models agencies should consider and is not necessarily a suitable 
replacement for all of their current sourcing models…”. Curiously then, the fact that the 
paragraph dealing with risks and issues came before the ones covering benefits and 
opportunities, seemed to warrant for a very meditated approach to this business model. 
The document ultimately underlined the opportunities lying in cost savings and increased 
agility, scalability and efficiency, further stimulated by the spread of the National 
Broadband Network (NBN)xxxviii, but acknowledged as well that some aspects of CC such 
as contracts, regulatory compliance and security were still immature. The policy stated 
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that agencies were allowed to shift services and applications in the cloud provided that 
they previously demonstrated that the game is worth the candle. This means not only 
ensuring that an adequate value for money is present, but also that the service is properly 
secured in accordance to the Australian Protective Security Policy Framework (PSPF)xxxix, 
the Australian Government Information Security Manual (ISM)xl and the Privacy Act of 
1988. Cloud services approach were a three phases process: 
 phase 1: from 2011, an “enabling” preparations phase, in which agencies received 
guidance about policy, principles, risk-management and contracts with a lot of 
knowledge sharing. The output was a Provider Certification Program as it happens in 
the U.S.A.; 
 phase 2: in parallel with phase 1, this stage involved public cloud service adoption. 
Australian Government Information Management Office (AGIMO) public web sites 
shifted towards the public cloud and this was the pilot for a Government wide 
migration strategy. Agencies were then encouraged to evaluate public/hybrid cloud 
offer and migrate application dealing with non sensitive data, when appropriate;  
 The last strategic phase (mid 2011 onwards) encompassed Data Centre Strategy 
integration, a Government storefront (similar to U.S. cio.gov) and 
investigation/adoption of private or community clouds. 
The Australian cloud strategy was not as articulated as the U.S.’s, but we surmise that the 
Government was looking at the cloud business with “wide open” eyes, taking the 
necessary time to ensure a meditated cloud adoption and exercising a strong degree of 
governance over agencies. 
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4. REMOTE ACQUISITION OF CLOUD STORAGE AREAS 
4.1 Open Issues 
A key role in the widespread diffusion of the Cloud has been played by distributed file 
systems and object stores, which allowed to reach virtually infinite storage capacity by 
summing the individual contributes of the disks placed inside commodity servers. Well 
known solutions exist, either proprietary or open source, that ensure high availability and 
geographic distributions of data. A side effect of a reliable and cheap storage area is the 
remarkably increasing chance that it can be used for harboring crime related data, such as 
credit card numbers, stolen identities or violated credentials. Unfortunately for the digital 
investigator, distributed architectures may entail difficulties when it comes to rebuild a 
global picture as files get partitioned in several chunks of configurable size and are 
scattered among a potentially vast population of participating nodes (Quick and Choo,  
2013)a. This most probably prevents forensic teams from dirtying their hands with write 
blockers and bit stream copiers because it is hard to detect which of the plethora of nodes 
hold relevant data without digging into file system internals. But this is regrettably just a 
part of the story: proprietary technologies, unavailability of the provider to deliver a 
console with root privileges to third parties or simply lack of jurisdiction help figure out 
why an on-field approach may simply be totally unfeasible. So the natural conclusion 
should be serving a warrant to cloud providers as, in principle, they are in the best 
position to extract relevant data from their platforms. While this approach seems 
straightforward and rid of troubles, relying on a party that does not natively offer a 
professional forensic service, requires that a good deal of trust be placed on procedures 
and tools used at the provider's premises (Dykstra and Sherman, 2012). Data should be 
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delivered to forensic investigators in a well known format, as complete as possible, 
integrity protected and non repudiable. Consider however the following scenarios where 
data acquired as a result of a warrant could be deemed unacceptable before a court for 
lack of reliability or sufficiency: 
 a system administrator without a specific forensic background uses an ordinary 
maintenance script to restore the requested data from a backup. As a result, content 
gets extracted, but some file metadata are overwritten; 
 deleted files are not recovered, even if this was technically possible;  
 once packaged, the blob gets delivered without integrity protection codes or it is 
impossible to uniquely associate it to the provider because of flaws in the chain of 
custody; 
 in case of proprietary templates, raw data is not exported in a well known format and 
browsing is only possible by means of a viewer program; 
Resorting to the scrutiny of a third party appointed as needed to audit and certify the 
operation would result into additional costs and possibly further delays. Agreeing 
beforehand on an acceptable strategy for acquisition of data between law enforcement 
(LE) and provider could translate into delays as well and might need to be redesigned 
when the counterpart changes. When a provider assisted Forensic As a Service (Dykstra 
and Sherman, 2012) is not available, a third way may be considered that  is secure, 
officially supported and reduces the point of contacts with the cloud provider so to 
possibly shorten times and lower costs. Given the self service nature of cloud platform, 
object storing is also exposed via entry points that usually reproduce all the features 
available from a web console. A low level interface based on SOAP or REST web services 
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enables user created applications to remotely execute operations on folders and files such 
as download and list. Higher level Software Development Kits SDKs are often available 
that wrap HTTP calls and allow a programmer to rely on languages like Java or PHP. 
Reasonable scopes of application include, but are not limited to, technical activities 
performed during pre-trial hearing with or without the consent of the defendant. In the 
first case the defendant willingly gives his credentials as he may have interest in taking a 
trusted snapshot of his cloud stored files without any modifications. In the latter scenario, 
by performing a forensic analysis of a seized computer law enforcement could have 
recovered username and passwords of a storage account (Quick and Choo, 2013)a or 
directly an access token string (AT) so to bypass user authentication, as it might be 
possible for Dropbox (see section 4.6.1.2). Here some issues concerning the applicable 
jurisdiction may apply, if the cloud platform is located abroad, but the point is disputed. 
From one side it can be argued that an official legal assistance is due not to acquire data 
unbeknownst to judicial authority hosting the cloud infrastructure, whereas, from another 
side, remotely accessing a cloud account by means of client applications which safeguards 
content integrity and ensures write protection may be considered admissible (Aterno and 
Mattiucci, 2013) within the umbrella of a local court order only. This uncertainty is most 
likely to stand until a consolidated case law is established. 
While the approach of a remote acquisition seems promising, there are some aspects that 
need to be deepened before blueprinting strategies and tools able to image remote data in 
a forensically sound way. First and foremost, forensic best practices, where possible, 
suggest avoiding alteration of digital evidences (DE) during acquisition. Therefore a read 
only access to cloud storage areas which mimics the write blocking mechanism applied in 
 
67 
 
traditional bit stream copy of physical mass memories would be beneficial. Indeed, 
Application Program Interfaces (API) do allow write access: upload, deletion and copy of 
objects are possible by design. Furthermore, while REST web services seems somehow the 
"lingua franca" for interacting programmatically with remote storage, the parameters that 
need to be specified in the calls may vary greatly from one platform to another and so do 
the format of returned data. An extra layer which harmonizes the syntactic differences is 
therefore needed. Not less important is the requirement of protecting the integrity of all 
the retrieved data and reporting all operations in a detailed log. With this foreword, this 
chapter describes the concepts and internals of the Cloud Data Imager Library (CDI Lib), a 
mediation layer we developed to enforce read only access to files and metadata of selected 
remote folders, while presenting a unified front end which masks out the syntactic and 
functional differences of cloud technologies. We built a desktop application on top of the 
library which, once instrumented with the necessary credentials, provides functionalities 
like folder listing with view of present, deleted and shared content, browsing of file 
revisions, extensive logging and imaging of folder trees with export to widespread 
forensic formats. CDI Lib currently supports access to three popular storage facilities: 
Dropbox, Google Drive and Microsoft OneDrive. 
4.2 Previous and related work 
Plenty of work has been developed about discovering traces left on client devices by the 
interaction with cloud storage platforms. For instance, Chung et al. (Chung, Park, Lee and 
Kang, 2012) have devised a procedure to collect remnants from computer and 
smartphones accessing, among others, Amazon S3 and Google Docs and  found that many 
artifacts can be recovered by digging into logs, cache files and databases present in a user 
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profile. In two consecutive papers Quick and Choo (Quick and Choo, 2013)a and (Quick 
and Choo, 2013)c accomplished a comprehensive analysis concerning traces recoverable in 
memory and persistent storage of a Windows PCs and Apple iPhone after Dropbox and 
Microsoft OneDrive services were accessed via browser or client applications. A similar 
research was accomplished for Amazon Cloud Drive (Hale, 2013). Conversely, procedures 
and tools for server side acquisition of file content and metadata from a cloud object store 
appear to deserve a far larger degree of deepening. Quick and Choo again (Quick and 
Choo, 2013)b have explored the possibility of collecting files from an user account of 
Dropbox, Google Drive and Microsoft OneDrive. As a preliminary consideration, the 
authors observe that their investigation lacked a suitable forensic software for the 
collection of data. As a consequence, their findings are somehow limited by the need of 
using an internet browser or the official client application. Indeed these are general 
purpose tools which were not designed with forensic principles in mind and, as the 
authors themselves observe, may not leave traces in client devices of precious information 
such a historical versions of files. Considering then the circumstance that one of the ends 
of the communication is under the control of the researchers, much more could be put in 
place than capturing SSL encrypted network traffic. However, one of the outcomes of their 
research is an important starting point of the present work as they determined that there 
were no changes in contents after having downloaded a file, while only some of the 
timestamps were preserved. The Cloud Data Imager project just aims at filling the gap 
outlined by the work of Quick and Choo. A dedicated forensic software could log the full 
conversation with the cloud platform at application level and in clear text, having if 
anything the issue to protect user credentials, access and refresh tokens (RT). Furthermore, 
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cloud APIs have provisions for retrieving the metadata of all items in a folder and this is 
crucial to set creation and modification times of downloaded files equal to the one hosted 
in the cloud storage area. Concerning the literature relevant to section 4.7, in the case of 
the Google FS, gaps which need to be filled in the road to a forensically ready cloud 
storage have been presented in (Spyridopoulos and Katos, 2011). The authors in particular 
discuss the need for the file system to permanently store the location of servers that host 
the data fragments composing each file, information which is instead kept in the volatile 
memory of the master node. 
4.3 Personal object stores 
Object stores are very popular facilities these days. They allow reliable persistence of 
user's content like documents or pictures thanks to a sparse architecture able to massively 
scale and tolerate component failures (Openstack, 2013). Their native interface is based on 
web services that allow interaction with objects in their entirety: for instance, it is not 
possible to modify an object by writing a defined amount of bytes at a certain position as 
allowed by traditional Portable Operating System Interface (POSIX) semantics. As a result, 
a modification of a document requires its previous deletion followed by an uploading of a 
new version of it and hence derives the property of immutability (Google, 2014)c. This is 
an aspect of major interest from a forensics point of view: differently from traditional file 
systems where an alteration of a file usually leaves no clue concerning its original content, 
object stores may keep a list of versions of those deleted objects, thus giving the chance to 
rebuild the history of modifications made to them and possibly disclosing precious 
information for the digital evidence analyst. 
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For ease of use, using a provider distributed application, storage areas can also be 
replicated with a two way synchronization on the file system of user's device and 
mounted like a regular local folder. An important aspect of a forensic investigation is the 
possibility for an examiner to find remnants of past activity which are not immediately 
manifest, not only in the final user's computer or tablet, but also in the cloud infrastructure 
itself. Data can be consumed from a variety of client devices which might be unavailable 
for an inspection and may change, be updated or erased: with its outstanding capacity of 
durability the cloud might be the only anchor of a case. In this respect, object stores 
usually feature trash containers in which items are put after deletion (Google, 2014)a. 
Depending on the quality of service subscribed, these can enforce temporary or long term 
persistence, until users decide for a permanent erasure. TRASH is a system folder to which 
items are transparently moved awaiting their fate. Equally remarkable for the forensic 
examiner is the possibility of the cloud platform to keep track of past versions of objects 
after their are updated by the user. The programming interface which exposes a storage 
area may have functionalities that go far beyond the retrieval of manifest content and may 
prove very relevant for computer forensics. For instance, trash and past revisions of a file 
may be available via remote query, so their accounting may be crucial to an investigation. 
Finally, not less important, is the possibility to retrieve objects metadata: some "data about 
data" may be extremely valuable because they are less under user's control. Consider the 
case in which an examiner could be led astray by a clever suspect that conveniently tweaks 
file timestamps on his laptop to support his claims. Conversely, uploading a new version 
of a document to a cloud store, for example as a consequence of a folder automatic 
backup, may retain its modification time, but updates the creation time to the current 
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remote platform system time so to possibly generate contradictions between the two 
timestamps. This is likely synchronized with a time server and is thus expected to be a 
much more reliable landmark than a notebook clock. For completeness sake, it has to be 
added though that policies on object timestamping may vary from a cloud provider to 
another and therefore they need to be evaluated case by case. 
4.4 Requirements for a novel application 
A forensic software, no matter how innovative, needs to comply with concepts and 
procedures set forth by relevant regulations and best practices. In this respect, this work 
relies on the guidance offered by ISO/IEC 27037 standard (International Organization for 
Standardization, 2012). This international standard contains guidelines directed to all the 
professionals who have to confront with potential DE, from identification to evaluation in 
a tribunal, needing to grant that this material comply with the generally accepted 
principles of relevance, reliability and sufficiency. The standard deals with four phases: 
identification (DE search and recognition), collection (removal of DE from its location), 
acquisition (creation of a copy) and preservation (safeguards to avoid that DE is tampered 
with, damaged or dispersed). Even if these guidelines does not explicitly deal with cloud 
storage services yet, we can consider them as delivered by non interruptible mission 
critical systems which can be reached only remotely and cannot be acquired in their 
entirety because of their size. Under these conditions, clauses 5.4.4, 7.1.3.3 and 7.1.3.4 of 
ISO/IEC 27037 states that a logical partial acquisition which targets specific file and 
directories is admissible. Focus will be on the two last phases listed by the standard: 
digital evidence copy and preservation. Identification is considered accomplished a priori 
as an outcome of an investigative activity leading to pinpoint the relevant cloud accounts. 
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Collection is not applicable: there is no digital evidence to remove from its location as 
everything is accomplished via a network. The following paragraph lists the requirements 
that should be fulfilled by a cloud storage forensic application (FA). 
4.4.1 Logical acquisition 
Forensic software should leverage provider delivered programming interface that allows 
unabridged retrieval of file content and metadata irrespective of cloud platform file 
system technology. An extra effort may be necessary to request by other means data which 
were not available remotely as in the case of access logs, deleted items or historical 
versions of documents. Should the provider expose both clear text and encrypted 
endpoints, the FA should rely on the latter to ensure confidentiality of communications. In 
this respect, Secure Socket Layer (SSL) is a ubiquitous protocol. 
4.4.2 Performed functions 
The module responsible for the communication with the cloud platform should implement 
a minimum set of functions which allow the following operations: 
 user authentication and authorization; 
 retrieval of user information like name and ID; 
 retrieval of folder metadata with its existing subfolders and files. Deleted items should 
be obtained as well, if possible. Metadata should include at minimum: name, size, 
creation and modification date. 
 listing of all available revisions of file, if available; 
 file content download; 
 retrieval of directories and files that someone else shared with the user, if this 
information is provided. 
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As method invocation syntax varies from a provider to another, this module should 
provide an harmonization layer which exposes a unified set of calls so to mask out 
possible differences like Uniform Resource Locator (URL) composition, input parameter 
list or formatting of returned data. 
4.4.3 Low level interface 
For completeness sake, developers should exercise care so to select the API that allows to 
retrieve the maximum amount possible of information. This may mean accessing the 
platform at the lowest possible level and may require a larger degree of development 
effort, but at same time it involves remarkable paybacks: 
 augmented control, which translates into the possibility of retrieving more potentially 
interesting information from the cloud platform; 
 the possibility to develop an application using languages for whom no SDK exist. 
For example, most providers publish SDKs with high level classes that wrap REST web 
services calls and greatly ease the life of programmers by reducing the amount of code 
necessary to perform operations on the data store. Consider the case of Dropbox: the latest 
core Java API to date is version 1.7.3. Invoking a method called getMetadataWithChildren 
from class DbxClient, which accepts the path of a folder as input, a list of entries of type 
DbxEntry.File or DbxEntry.Folder is returned, that represents all the files and subfolders 
contained within. Each entry is a data structure which does not contain a flag to inform if 
the folder or file has been deleted. The same happens with the latest Java API for Android 
version 1.5.4, where folder listing can be obtained by calling a method named metadata 
belonging to class DropboxAPI. This time the returned list of structures, namely 
DropboxAPI.Entry, would include a field named is_deleted which however is not assigned 
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because metadata has no input parameter to request the inclusion of deleted items in the 
returned list. Getting those items from Dropbox could be possible as they live for 30 days 
for unpaid accounts and forever in case of paid subscriptions. It is therefore necessary to 
leverage the REST web services interface, which is the foundation of every higher level 
SDK: invoking a GET method with an include_deleted parameter equal to true returns a 
JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) formatted list which includes deleted folder and files. It 
was the only way we were able to achieve this result. 
4.4.4 Read only access 
Conforming to the principle of reliability of digital evidence, cloud stored content and 
metadata should be secured against any accidental change. This translates into the 
requirement for the FA to access remote content in a read only manner. Indeed, similar to 
traditional bit stream copies of digital evidences, best practices advise, if possible, to 
implement a write blocking mechanism to avert the risk of invalidating an acquisition. 
This cannot always be guaranteed in case of usage of internet browsers and provider 
delivered client applications because they could possibly cause accidental modifications to 
storage areas. Other avenues for alteration of the remote content which could be 
performed by third parties must be discussed with the provider and eliminated, if 
possible. Example solutions could include: 
 a new account released to LE with exclusive access to suspect's storage area; 
 if suspect's recovered own credentials are used, exclusive login could be granted only 
to LE's forensic workstation or write permissions could be removed by the provider 
from the account. 
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4.4.5  Officially supported interface 
The forensic application will be mandatorily based on stable and officially supported API. 
Under no circumstance programming interfaces offered by third parties can be leveraged, 
if they did not received a prior endorsement by the cloud provider. This strongly excludes 
for example function calls which were obtained by reverse engineering of code or via 
protocol inspectors. 
4.4.6 On demand folder browsing 
Conforming to the principle of sufficiency of digital evidence, the FA should offer the 
possibility to browse an account in order to possibly exclude from imaging those folders 
that appear clearly irrelevant. To avoid unnecessary network traffic, instead of walking the 
whole directory tree beforehand, metadata can be retrieved and cached only when 
examiner's navigations requests it. The chance of performing a prior selection is also 
important for triaging data in case of very large stores that cannot be wholly acquired in 
the allowed timeframe. File content preview should be possible also for deleted and 
previous versions, if available. The on demand nature of folder browsing excludes a blind 
synchronization of the data store with a local folder when the FA starts. 
4.4.7 Native logging 
Clause 5.3.2 of ISO/IEC 27037 states the importance of documentation to allow an 
independent assessor to evaluate all actions performed. To meet this requirement, the 
forensic software should therefore support a logging facility of configurable verbosity to 
create an audit trail for all actions. All relevant events stemming from the interaction with 
the cloud platform, user actions or error conditions should be accounted for. The times 
should indicate the shift from Coordinated Universal Time (UTC), if any, for 
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disambiguation purposes. If possible, at the end of operations, the log file should be 
hashed and timestamped via certification services delivered by a legal authority in order 
to locate it in a defined point in time. Due care should be observed in protecting sensitive 
information like user credentials or restricted configuration parameters. For instance, 
when a request of listing the content of a folder is issued, access tokens used for 
authorization get recorded. Protection could be enforced by creating an unabridged 
master copy of the log file which is stored securely and a working copy to be delivered to 
trial parties where sensitive data are masked off. This way original information can be 
accessed in a controlled manner should the Court deem this necessary. An efficient 
logging methodology could avoid the usage of extra recording facilities like screenshots, 
video footages or secure HTTP protocol decoders as Telerik's Fiddler web proxyxli, which 
is able to decrypt protected traffic with a man-in-the-middle approach. 
4.4.8 Folder imaging 
Once the examiner has selected the relevant folder, the FA must faithfully traverse the 
complete tree so to copy remote data into logical evidence files and should compute 
integrity protection codes to avert the possibility that the evidence is tampered with after 
it has been acquired. For instance, a cumulative cryptographic hash of all data retrieved by 
the server could be calculated and an accompanying file hash list could be a valuable 
addition. The output format of the image may vary: it could be for instance a database or a 
local folder that reproduces the structure of the cloud area. In the latter case, metadata 
information can be put in a text file inside its corresponding folder: these are the trusted 
origin of information about files and folders, in particular when copied items do not 
preserve some fields such as creation time. The crucial aspect of imaging operations is that 
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file contents and metadata of the target folder and subfolders be copied in their entirety as 
received by the server, including trashed files and revisions. The latter may constitute an 
added value over analyzing physical copies of disks: for instance, in a New Technology 
File System (NTFS) formatted volume of a Windows 7 box, previous versions of a file are 
recoverable only if a user made a backup or if System Protection is enabled to allow 
shadow copies be created. Even in this case, only the copy which was present just before 
the restore point creation will be available. 
4.5 Evaluation of current tools 
After a literature perusal and due technology scouting, it appears that the arsenal for 
remote data retrieval of cloud storage areas is not very populated. General purpose tools 
such as internet browsers or provider delivered client applications can be useful allies in 
an investigation and can be certainly used if they produce the expected results, but we 
need to stress an incomplete compliance to some of the above requirements, for instance 
read only access or native logging. They are not forensics applications indeed, but were 
designed to allow a convenient read-write access to users, so missing functions need to be 
provided externally by other software. Provided that he is able to justify the reason for his 
actions, the investigator is not bound to specific tools, but it could be beneficial to the 
quality of technical assessments relying on instruments able to increase the overall level of 
auditability and justifiability. The following table reports a compliance test to the 
aforementioned requirements in case of access by means of browsers (Microsoft IE10 and 
Mozilla Firefox 25.0.1) and desktop applications for Dropbox (version 2.0.22), Google 
Drive (release 1.12.5329.1887) and Microsoft OneDrive (build 17.0.2015.0811). Although 
coarse grained, this test brings some food for thought.  
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Requirement Client Browser Notes 
Logical 
acquisition 
Pass Pass Both tools allow to create local copies of remote files 
and folders 
Performed 
functions 
Fail Pass Browser access is compliant with all requested 
functions, conversely no deleted items and previous 
versions of files available with all desktop clients. No 
shared contents available for Google Drive and 
Microsoft OneDrive clients   
Low level access Fail Pass Considering the rationale of retrieving the maximum 
amount possible of information, desktop clients fail as 
they do not show versioned or deleted files, which is 
instead possible with a browser access 
Read only access Fail Fail Write access is granted for both tools 
 
Official interface Pass Pass Desktop clients are delivered by cloud providers 
themselves and browsers access provider web sites 
Folder browsing Fail Pass Browser allow on demand folder navigation. Client 
applications imply prior blind synchronization of the 
remote data store, which may include irrelevant data 
Native logging Fail Fail Neither tool logs communications with remote servers 
with the needed detail. Extra recording tools can be put 
in place, such as screen captures and video recording of 
operations. For browsers, tools like Telerik's Fiddler 
web debugging proxy can be leveraged which decodes 
secure HTTP traffic 
Folder imaging Fail Fail Both can acquire a whole directory tree, but some 
folder metadata is not preserved. No hash functions are 
used to protect integrity for both tools 
Table 4-1 Fail/pass test for browsers and client applications 
Table 4.1 shows that desktop clients, despite allowing a convenient navigation on a local 
copy of data, do not show objects that were revised or deleted, do not preserve item 
creation time and by default perform a blind synchronization, possibly including 
irrelevant material. An internet browser has more to offer from a forensic point of view as 
it can download selected folders as compressed files or show deleted items and revisions 
(in Microsoft OneDrive the latter are available only for Office documents). However, both 
tools allow modification of target items and do not provide dedicated logging or integrity 
protection via hash codes. As a part of its forensic products offer, F-Responsexlii delivers a 
Cloud Connector which enables one to mount a cloud storage platform as a local logical 
volume or network share. Unfortunately, a copy of the software is not available for tests, 
but it is anyhow worth noting that, according to the public available manual rel. 5.0.1, it is 
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guaranteed a write protection mechanism. This is compliant with clause 4.4.4 and is very 
important from a forensic standpoint. However, performed functions seem not to include 
the possibility to retrieve deleted items, past versions of files or shared folders. These 
features, according to contacts with the company, will be provided in future releases. 
Differently from the provisions of clause 4.4.8, Cloud Connector does not directly perform 
folder imaging, but rather prepares the ground for a third party product. 
4.6 Architecture and functions 
Cloud Data Imager is a novel forensic tool for the remote collection of data from cloud 
storage accounts which fulfills all the requirements listed in the previous sections. The two 
main features are directory  browsing with visualization of file content and logical copy of 
a selected folder tree, not necessarily the root, to a local repository.  Access to Dropbox, 
Google Drive and Microsoft OneDrive platforms is currently implemented, but 
development plans include support for other "Storage as a Service" facilities either public 
such as Amazon S3xliii or private like Openstack's Swiftxliv. The tool features a library 
which mediates between an overlying application and the provider exposed programming 
interface. Figure 4.1 shows global architecture and functions:  
 
Figure 4-1 CDI architecture and functions 
Dropbox Google Drive Microsoft OneDrive 
Drive 
 
80 
 
4.6.1 CDI library 
The APIs exposed by the mentioned providers have some important commonalities such 
as an interface based on HTTPS requests and the usage of OAUTH 2.0 as a protocol for 
authentication and authorization (Hardt, 2012). However, there are important differences 
that must be accounted for: URLs to which direct requests, methods and syntax for 
parameter passing and data structures returned in server answers. After being  initialized 
with a provider ID,  the library hides this lack of homogeneity and publish an unified set 
of calls irrespective of the underlying cloud technology. This enforces interoperability 
among cloud platforms and greatly simplifies the development of an application built on 
top of the library as a distinction among providers is made only once in the part of code 
that handles initialization. The available functions are listed in table 4.2. 
Name Category Function 
getAuthorizeUrlV2 Authentication 
and 
Authorization 
OAUTH 2.0. Retrieves the URL to be addressed by a 
browser to let user authorize access to cloud account. If 
user authorizes, page returns an authentication code 
getAccessTokenV2 Authentication 
and 
Authorization 
OAUTH 2.0. Exchanges the authentication code in the 
authorization web page to an access token string to be 
used in subsequent service request  
getAccountInfo Information Retrieves user name and ID of the account holder 
listFolder Browsing and 
Imaging 
Retrieves metadata of a folder including its files and 
subfolders 
listFileRevisions Browsing and 
Imaging 
Retrieves metadata of all previous revision of a file 
getFileContent Browsing and 
Imaging 
Gets the raw content of a file 
Table 4-2 List of calls exported by CDI library 
It can be seen that requirement 4.4.2 is satisfied along with 4.4.3, because CDI leverages the 
REST web services interface which is at the lowest possible level. Read only access (see 
requirement 4.4.4) is then guaranteed as all methods which handle users data are based on 
HTTP GETs. The library was  developed after browsing the official literature (requirement 
4.4.5) published by Microsoft (REST reference Live Connect, 2014), Google (Google, 2014)b 
and Dropbox (Dropbox, 2014). Finally, operations get logged in a text file with a 
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configurable verbosity level which defaults to DEBUG, the most complete (requirement 
4.4.7). This means that all the requests and responses generated by functions listed in table 
4.2, saved getFileContent to avoid excessive space consumption, are recorded verbatim as 
issued to or received from the cloud platform. The CDI project is written in C# for .NET 
framework 4 or higher and requires Windows 7 or later. It leverages Json.NET package 
(Newton-King, 2013) to parse JSON formatted server answers along with Log4net (The 
Apache Software Foundation, 2013)b as a logging facility. All the providers listed in the 
following require that a developer register to get an app key and secret. These credentials 
are embedded in CDI library authentication and authorization functions. 
4.6.1.1 OAUTH 
 
The OAUTH authorization framework version 2 is the de facto standard for authorizing 
access via web services (Hardt, 2012) to a restricted resource on behalf of a third party. 
Differently from traditional client-server scenarios, a client application is not aware of the 
credentials of the owner: it is issued a temporary token to access the resource after the 
owner has logged on an authorizing server and explicitly accepted the access scope 
requested by the application. Scopes may include for instance the permission to modify an 
entire directory tree or just a single folder and the ability to operate when the owner is not 
logged on the storage platform. Access tokens are character strings of variable length 
issued by authorization servers which need to be attached to authenticate every request to 
resource servers. They are usually short lived: one hour is a typical value. To allow offline 
operations when the user is not logged in, a refresh token may be released to applications 
along with the access token after a user has given his consent. RT's goal is to be presented 
to authorization servers only to acquire a new AT so to extend admittance without 
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requiring user intervention. In this respect, CDI library keeps track of AT lifetime and, 
prior to expiration, leverages RTs to transparently renegotiate the issue of a new one. This 
offloads the application from handling the renewal of credentials from time to time. Figure 
4.2 shows OAUTH 2 flow triggered by CDI over an HTTPS protected channel: 
1. a  browser session is started where the Authentication & Authorization server is 
contacted and a login form is presented to the user; 
2. user authenticates and approves the list of scopes requested by the application; 
3. Authentication & Authorization server releases an AT and possibly a RT to allow the 
application to operate on behalf of the user when he is not logged in; 
4. The AT string is attached to any following resource request.  
Oauth 2.0 : diagrams 
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Figure 4-2 CDI Oauth 2 flow 
4.6.1.2 Dropbox 
Dropbox's authorization scopes include read/write permissions on either a dedicated 
folder or the full user's dropbox. It's a coarse grained permission scheme as, for instance, it 
is not possible to get read only access to all files and folders, even if content integrity is still 
preserved thanks to http GETs usage made by CDI library. Differently from other 
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providers, access tokens have not an expiration time: they can be used in the long term 
until user repeats authorization process or explicitly revokes them. This means that once 
stored on a durable medium, a poor protection policy of the AT could lead third parties to 
bypass user authorization and access his data without further ado. For this reason CDI 
library keeps AT only in volatile memory and, as stated in paragraph 4.4.7, in the log file 
asterisks are put in place of AT characters to avoid sensitive information leaks. Listing of a 
folder items and file revisions has an upper bound. The former defaults to 10,000 and the 
latter to 10. An error code will be returned for listings containing a number of files 
exceeding the limit. Accordingly, listFolder and listFileRevisions will return no more than 
25000 and 1000 files which are the topmost listing limit. Dropbox's allows retrieval of 
deleted and revised items: unlimited deletion recovery and version history is granted to 
paid accounts whereas this ability is limited to 30 days for the free ones. Concerning the 
metadata returned by the API for deleted files, it has been verified that their size is zero 
bytes and  client_mtime, the original file modification time which is retained if the file is 
uploaded with Dropbox's desktop application, is invariably set to Dec 31st 1969, 23:59:59 
+0000. 
4.6.1.3 Google Drive 
Google Drive has a more flexible authorization scheme with a granularity ranging from 
full read/write permissions on all user files to single per file access. CDI library leverages 
"https://www.googleapis.com/auth/drive.readonly" parameter, which grants read only access to 
all files and metadata thus giving further assurance that user data are not modified in any 
way. Access tokens have a typical lifetime of one hour and are issued along with refresh 
tokens because CDI library requires an offline access type in order to carry possibly 
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lengthy calculations such as folder imaging.  Google Drive keeps track of file versions, but 
this requires space. So they are deleted after 30 days or if there are more than 100 revisions 
of a file. However, the user can decide to avoid this auto deletion policy on a per file basis. 
Listing of a folder  defaults to 100 items and listFolder will stretch to the upper bound of 
1000 items. Conversely, there are not input parameters which limit the number of returned 
revisions of a file, even if the default number will be 100 as per deletion policy. 
4.6.1.4 Microsoft OneDrive 
Microsoft OneDrive features an even more comprehensive authorization scheme which is 
able to give separate permissions to user's profile, contacts, calendar, multimedia content 
or more generally to files.  CDI library uses the following scopes: 
 wl_basic: to get user's name ad ID; 
 wl_contacts_skydrive: to obtain read only access and retrieve metadata and content of all 
folder and files belonging to the users or shared by others; 
 wl.offline_access: to operate also when the user is not signed in via the refresh token 
mechanism. 
Once the user has authorized, scopes are cached in the "App and services" tab of his 
account and need to be explicitly revoked in case of need. Deleted files are sent to the 
recycle bin and kept for at most 30 days in case of free accounts. Permanence in the bin 
depends on its size: if it reaches 10% of the storage capacity files are removed earlier, but 
not before three days after deletion (Shahine, 2012). Version history exists, but they are 
available for Microsoft Office documents only. The most severe limitation from a forensic 
standpoint is the lack of API functions that expose the recycle bin and previous releases of 
a file. This somehow weakens the power of remote collection tools, even if  the benefits of 
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ensuring a write protection, producing an audit trail and safeguarding integrity via hashes 
is still rather valuable. The API call for listing folder contents has no input parameter 
limiting the number of returned children. 
4.6.2 CDI Application 
The dashboard is divided into three functional areas as depicted in figure 4.3: a central 
area with a tree and list view for navigation purposes, a left panel for provider selection 
and an upper zone for information. The tree shows the selected folder only, whereas the 
columns in the list show items Name, Size, Modification and Upload date. The upper right 
zone details diagnostic information as logged by the application, starting from the 
selection of a provider: every action such as folder listing or visualization of a file is 
recorded in a session log whether successful or not. In the latter case the error code 
returned by the cloud platform is written as well. 
 
Figure 4-3 CDI dashboard 
There are a few configuration parameters, some belonging to a common part and some 
differentiated, included in a XML file. In particular, there are two lines in which 
application key and secret are recorded. This is because Cloud Data Imager is in beta 
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version to date and has not been yet endorsed by cloud providers which may enforce 
limits on access for applications not yet ready for production. For instance, Dropbox 
allows at most one hundred concurrent accesses for applications still under development, 
so the author cannot embed his credentials for widespread diffusion yet. Therefore, CDI 
users will have to register a fictitious application for every provider for which no official 
approval exist and get application credentials. These need to be input only once for 
provider in the edit boxes just above the blue "Authorize" button (see fig. 4.3). Once 
written in the configuration file their confidentiality is protected leveraging Effortless.NET 
encryption library (Effortless .Net Encryption, 2012) with a 256 bit key generated from a 
user chosen passphrase. After a cloud provider has been selected, a new work session can 
begin and a check is performed against the presence of a valid AT in the configuration file. 
Recalling the introduction, this could be when a technical activity is carried out bypassing 
user consent when investigators have to enforce a court order. In this case, an AT could 
therefore have been directly obtained by the provider or retrieved as a result of the 
inspection of a suspect’s equipment, but must not have a limited lifetime because no out of 
band refresh token is expected in the configuration file. Otherwise, if no AT is available, 
the whole OAUTH 2.0 process is started: a browser session is initiated which requests 
authentication to the selected cloud platform. Once user has successfully logged in, an 
authorization page is presented that states the access scopes requested by the application. 
Once the user has accepted, his ID is retrieved along with the content of the root folder, 
which is named after the user ("seminario tenerife" in Fig.4.3) and the content of the items 
which have been shared with the user ("shared items" in Fig.4.3). This latter is not shown for 
Dropbox because shared folders appear as root children. From now on the usual explorer- 
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like navigation can begin. As stated in paragraph 4.4.6, the metadata of files and 
subfolders are retrieved only on demand and then cached. A file can be visualized by 
double clicking on it. This action has the file downloaded, saved in a configurable working 
directory and opened with the associated viewer. Deleted files, if supported, are marked 
with a red X and are viewable as well. Also file versions, if available, are viewable with a 
right click on a selected file and their icon has the left side filled with red. The list is 
displayed in a separated window, with the newest release on top, which shows a revision 
ID (Fig.4.4). 
 
Figure 4-4 An example of Dropbox file revisions list 
4.6.2.1 Imaging a directory tree 
With a "right click and confirm" on a folder in the tree navigation pane the user can 
unleash the imaging process which, in accordance with paragraph 4.4.8, entails a logical 
copy of metadata and content of every subfolder and file. This is a three stages run: 
1. creation, format and mount of a virtual hard disk (VHD) which will host the logical 
image. VHD is a specification made public by Microsoft under its Open Specification 
Promise (Microsoft, 2013) for encapsulating a volume in a file. By leveraging a hidden 
instance of the Diskpart Windows utility, CDI creates a fixed virtual hard disk, whose 
room requirements are calculated in a preliminary phase according to cloud storage 
size plus a 20% margin. In any case, the minimum volume size is 512 MB to keep low 
the percentage of sectors requested by file system service structures compared to space 
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available for data. Alternatively, if the user knows the upper bounds of cloud storage 
size, he can choose a predefined or custom virtual hard disk size so to save the time 
needed to calculate remote storage dimensions. In all cases the virtual volume will be 
NTFS formatted to overcome FAT32 4 GB file size limitations and it is possible to 
decide whether to perform a quick or a full format. At last the volume will be mounted 
and assigned the first available drive letter from H to Z; 
2. At this point the whole remote directory structure is recreated on the mounted drive. 
For each folder, a text file named "$cdi$_metadata.txt" is created which contains the 
unabridged server response to the listFolder call. For each file owning at least one 
historical version, a text file named after it is created to whom the suffix 
"_$cdi$_rev_metadata.txt" is appended. It again contains the complete answer to the 
invocation of the listFileRevisions function. These additional files are therefore created 
by the imaging process and their goal is clear: as they contain the metadata of every 
folder and file present in the cloud storage, their presence mimic the acquisition of the 
remote file table structure. Creation and modification timestamps of every recreated 
item are set equal to the original, but this is just for reader's ease. In case of doubt, trust 
must be put only in the content of xxx_metadata.txt files. For all data received by the 
server, two cumulative message digests are calculated with MD5 and SHA1 
cryptographic functions and recorded in the log. These will be known as inner hashes 
and will be checked against the content of all downloaded files plus xxx_metadata.txt 
files. An MD5-SHA1 hash list of all files is also created. To verify inner hashes, the 
imaged folder needs to be traversed in the exact order of this list otherwise there will 
be not match. When the list is produced, a check is made to compare the calculated 
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value against the expected hash value included in file's metadata, if available (as in the  
case of Google Drive which stores an md5 hash of each file). An error is reported in the 
log if a mismatch is detected; 
3. At last, the fixed virtual disk is dismounted and the .VHD file is converted to raw 
format by removing a 512 bytes footer. It is then exported in the Guidance Software's 
Expert Witness Format, one of the most widespread forensic container to date, silently 
running the ewfacquire tool from the libewf  (Metz, 2013) project. EWF is a compressed 
format so the outcomes are .Exx files whose sum can be much less in size that the 
virtual disk. EWF has provisions for editable additional information such as case 
number or notes. Values of inner hashes are appended to these notes for examiner's 
convenience. Ewfacquire will also include in the container an MD5 and a SHA1 message 
digest calculated on the whole virtual volume so to preserve its integrity. This includes 
NTFS service tables and files and therefore will be definitely different from the inner 
hashes. They will then be called  outer hashes. Figure 4.5 displays the content of a 
sample EWF file, created as the result of the image of root folder in figure 4.3, opened 
with AccessData FTK Imager utilityxlv with which outer hashes can be verified. 
 
Figure 4-5 FTK imager's view of root folder 
Making a comparison to figure 4.3, it can be seen that: 
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 conforming to the convention adopted by the most famous tools as Encase, deleted 
items are prepended with an underscore; 
 file3.txt has one previous version 
"file3_rev_0B_6aHERKHo_rU1BXRGdkZHRXRjdJZWwyck0xdGZETnNCNGtZPQ.txt" 
named after it with its revision id suffix. "file3.txt_$cdi$_rev_metadata.txt" contains 
revision information as received by the cloud storage platform; 
 the same applies to documento.txt, saved the fact that it was renamed from doc.txt; 
 modification dates of all downloaded files and folders are retained. Creation 
timestamps, that is date and time an item was uploaded to the cloud, are retained as 
well, but are not showed by FTK Imager. A search for these date and times can be 
made against the content of file "$cdi$_metadata.txt" which is not shown for the sake of 
brevity; 
 volume is named CDI. 
It should be clear at this point that EWF files produced by CDI are functionally equivalent, 
for the part of file system content/metadata and neglecting slack space and unallocated 
sectors, to bit stream imaging a physical hard drive NTFS formatted containing present 
and deleted files/folders hosted in a cloud personal storage. Outer hashes protect EWF 
files integrity and chain of custody preservation whereas a widespread format guarantees 
that every forensic expert worldwide is able to handle images produced by CDI. 
4.6.2.2 Test findings 
We have devised a field tests plan organized in one hundred trials, half of which were 
accomplished to put under stress the application and half to try out all functionalities with 
small collections. In the former scenario, all runs but two were successfully carried out to 
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verify operation continuity beyond the hour of imaging activity when an access token is 
silently renewed by CDI library (not applicable for Dropbox). We hashed every sample file 
before uploading it to a folder in the cloud storage and repeated the same operation for its 
corresponding copy after each session. We detected no differences in content between 
original files and copies after imaging multi gigabyte folders with thousands of files of 
many different kinds, like pictures, videos or documents, some weighting several hundred 
of megabytes. The two failed runs were caused by network issues and just required a fresh 
restart. Error codes were displayed on the screen and recorded in the session log file. In 
future releases of the tool we will consider the possibility to resume operations from the 
point of interruption. Functionality tests were all successful. For instance, in a session a 
few public documents belonging to the data catalog of the District of Columbia 
(http://data.dc.gov/) were downloaded and unzipped, notably Crime Incidents from 
2011 to 2013 and Purchase Orders from 2008 to 2011. These were selected because they are 
easily editable to verify how CDI wields historical versions. We calculated an MD5 and a 
SHA1 hash for every file using HashCheck Windows shell extension version 2.1.11xlvi and 
created with this tool two separate hash lists, namely data.dc.gov.md5 and 
data.dc.gov.sha1, to simulate the presence of small sized text files. The 9 files collection 
hosted in a folder named data.dc.gov is listed in table 4.3. We carried out all operations with 
a Windows 7 box on October 14th 2013 UTC +2, which coincides with the creation date of 
all files (not showed), selecting a data connection ranging in the average from 200 to 300 
Kbytes/sec to verify CDI response with low speed networks. However, such a connection 
already suffices for a positive user experience as navigation usually entails acceptable 
delays in opening folders. 
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Name Last mod Size MD5 SHA1 
crime_incidents_
2011_CSV.csv 
13/10/2013 
8:40 
5136 
KB 
7e1854bcb6ebe6267650b49e
88c43860 
867fba1fb14864aeb4826e4f20a5c5e4
fe91704b 
crime_incidents_
2012_CSV.csv 
13/10/2013 
8:35 
5323 
KB 
688047a9186a8254d3e01c37
4e47b3d8 
55efdc1097451fb1ff332ab4fd248639
760040f2 
crime_incidents_
2013_CSV.csv 
13/10/2013 
8:30 
4092 
KB 
afb6d9a2a2ecbca577586cf41
284b775 
75716055e36e1ddc5ba7ba92ce47f4c
82f2230c9 
data.dc.gov.md5 14/10/2013 
10:21 
1 KB 590791fb8e75c6b213b4be36
c0753cd0 
25096eb28b031e2a9595d0251d716d
bc7162518f 
data.dc.gov.sha1 14/10/2013 
10:21 
1 KB 796b74ebc114b0486550f787
d5fe93ed 
3c2c784649f21af943230450ed70fea6
8ec6c421 
pass_2008_plain.
xml 
31/12/2009 
3:50 
15581 
KB 
4666f0b18baf059a5f4acdcef
0217e0d 
8b0c6cd118665c7ed662ef0d0ae7bb3
7fcc867f3 
pass_2009_plain.
xml 
31/12/2010 
3:50 
14531 
KB 
0669a81a8d6b6681dcfb444d
f3428ab5 
aa09ee3ff3708d34559d30db7c65f35
0e38557dd 
pass_2010_plain.
xml 
31/12/2011 
3:50 
13659 
KB 
fe35c7d30ad6f2ebcfae50b3b
bcc2cf8 
ad5b29495376da30e52ba10b17294c
984d97ebed 
pass_2011_plain.
xml 
31/12/2012 
3:50 
12096 
KB 
07d3e48f971bd0f4bb40a7e7
c32bbfa7 
c2778fbaf497938efe730e8efb9a74dfc
947a555 
Table 4-3 List of the sample collection used for testing 
We uploaded the folder data.dc.gov to Dropbox, Google Drive and Microsoft OneDrive 
leveraging the associate desktop application. At a later time, we moved the file 
data.dc.gov.md5 to a newly created subdirectory named "2013" and then edited it to 
create a revision by removing all asterisks from the content, obtaining the new hash values 
of 5c87472d77ff352f20469baf4648918a and 296a78be66c2c727338abdbbd57606ce35f3b280 
for MD5 and SHA1 algorithm respectively. We performed these operations also for 
OneDrive, notwithstanding the mentioned inability of remotely retrieving past versions 
and trashed items. Findings of imaging activity of root folder data.dc.gov, containing 9 files 
and 1 subfolder were as follows: 
 Dropbox: The imaging process took 5 minutes and 50 seconds, inclusive of remote 
folder size calculation, to create a 9587 KB .E01 file, discovering and downloading 
twelve files and 2 subfolders for a total amount of 72108148 bytes. There are 3 files and 
1 folder more than the Windows local folder (see Fig 4.6 and 4.7). This is because 
data.dc.gov.md5 is still accounted as a zero sized file in the root and its revision stems 
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from the uploading of file in table 3. In subfolder "2013" there is the last edited copy 
plus its revision generated from the moving of file data.dc.gov.md5. So in all there are 
two revisions plus a zero sized file in excess. Explanation of the sequence may clarify 
further: 
1. At 09:21:57 UTC (server time) data.dc.gov.md with modification time of 08:21:45 
UTC is created in the cloud storage root after client synchronization; 
2. At 09:52:23 UTC the file is moved to subfolder "2013" and a zero sized file is created. 
3. At 09:53:49 UTC (client time) the content is changed as asterisks are removed in 
local copy. A new synchronization forces the creation of a new remote object at 
09:54:12 (server time). 
The excess folder is a deleted one named "Nuova cartella" (New folder) which is the 
original name assigned by Windows before renaming to "2013". The imaging process 
created five more files: three to host metadata of all directories ("root", "2013" and "Nuova 
cartella") plus two for revisions metadata of data.dc.gov.md5 in folder "root" and "2013". 
 
Figure 4-6 Dropbox's content of data.dc.gov and revisions of file data.dc.gov.md5 
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Figure 4-7 Dropbox's content of data.dc.gov/2013 and revisions of file data.dc.gov.md5 
A hash list of the imaged folder was exported by opening the .E01 file with FTK imager. 
Fingerprints matched both the files in Table 4.3 and the list produced by CDI (Table 
4.4), where the file data.dc.gov.md5 in folder "root" is missing because is zero sized. 
Browsing with CDI and FTK showed that modification timestamps were retained after 
desktop client upload. 
Name MD5 SHA1 
\$cdi$_metadata.txt 9fa2fcbd0e3e3ab495c86
5a733b752d0 
78f0e59a04581ebbbe4988
a46ce8dd54d2bad51f 
\2013\$cdi$_metadata.txt 716398474c5d10b2559e1
394bd55f56d 
7eee567da6ade14bc3cc8c
3abff92cefd74521b1 
\2013\data.dc.gov.md5 5c87472d77ff352f20469b
af4648918a 
296a78be66c2c727338abd
bbd57606ce35f3b280 
\2013\data.dc.gov.md5_$cdi$_rev_metadata
.txt 
bb80f6263af2371cc4570
288870ca48c 
1a8310d06ae378dc64e84
814bedca91ee4fa5943 
\2013\data.dc.gov_rev_1e14336529.md5 590791fb8e75c6b213b4b
e36c0753cd0 
25096eb28b031e2a9595d
0251d716dbc7162518f 
\crime_incidents_2011_CSV.csv 7e1854bcb6ebe6267650b
49e88c43860 
867fba1fb14864aeb4826e
4f20a5c5e4fe91704b 
\crime_incidents_2012_CSV.csv 688047a9186a8254d3e01
c374e47b3d8 
55efdc1097451fb1ff332ab
4fd248639760040f2 
\crime_incidents_2013_CSV.csv afb6d9a2a2ecbca577586
cf41284b775 
75716055e36e1ddc5ba7b
a92ce47f4c82f2230c9 
data.dc.gov.md5_$cdi$_rev_metadata.txt dee6bd5169c68fe448c37
efd67b55794 
b0d5f3683a37a5ac082c50
2e23b266145f2708d2 
\data.dc.gov_rev_1114336529.md5 590791fb8e75c6b213b4b
e36c0753cd0 
25096eb28b031e2a9595d
0251d716dbc7162518f 
\data.dc.gov.sha1 796b74ebc114b0486550f
787d5fe93ed 
3c2c784649f21af94323045
0ed70fea68ec6c421 
\_nuova cartella\$cdi$_metadata.txt 65d80a2397798bcbc6887
5f91531b8ee 
597712bf2b714f7e29251c
74f0ae26ded36a785b 
\pass_2008_plain.xml 4666f0b18baf059a5f4ac
dcef0217e0d 
8b0c6cd118665c7ed662ef
0d0ae7bb37fcc867f3 
\pass_2009_plain.xml 0669a81a8d6b6681dcfb4
44df3428ab5 
aa09ee3ff3708d34559d30
db7c65f350e38557dd 
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\pass_2010_plain.xml fe35c7d30ad6f2ebcfae50
b3bbcc2cf8 
ad5b29495376da30e52ba
10b17294c984d97ebed 
\pass_2011_plain.xml 
 
07d3e48f971bd0f4bb40a
7e7c32bbfa7 
c2778fbaf497938efe730e8
efb9a74dfc947a555 
Table 4-4 File hashlist.txt produced by the imaging process 
 Google Drive: Similar considerations can be made for Google Drive. The imaging 
process took 5 minutes and 41 seconds to terminate, producing a 9586 KB .E01 file, 
discovering and downloading 72107684 bytes organized in ten files and 1 subfolder. 
Differently from Dropbox, Google Drive just keeps track of the revision of 
data.dc.gov.md5 in folder "2013" and so there is only one file more than the Windows 
local folder and no other subfolders where created. The lack of one revision explains 
why 464 bytes less than Dropbox's storage where found. The imaging process thus 
created three more files: two to host metadata for directories ("root" and "2013") plus 
one for revisions metadata. The hash list produced after opening the .E01 file with FTK 
imager matched both the files in Table 4.3 and the list produced by CDI. Browsing with 
CDI and FTK showed again that modification dates and times are kept after desktop 
upload. 
 Microsoft OneDrive: Process took 6 minutes and 11 seconds to produce a 9580 KB .E01 
image. 72107220 bytes were discovered in 9 files and 1 subfolder, just like the Windows 
local directory. The missing 464 bytes revision in subfolder "2013" compared to Google 
Drive accounts for the lesser amount of bytes found. Two more files $cdi$_metadata.txt 
were produced during imaging, one located in the root directory and the other in the 
"2013" subfolder. Again a perfect match of all hash lists confirmed that there were no 
modifications in file contents. This is also true for modification timestamps which were 
retained, provided that it is used a parameter named "client_updated_time" in the JSON 
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formatted answer of Microsoft servers. Otherwise, the previously considered 
"updated_time" was current as it initially coincides with "created_time", the moment the 
file was uploaded to the cloud platform (server time). This seems much like the 
"client_mtime" field of Dropbox answers, whereas for Google Drive the parameter 
"modifiedDate" was considered. 
4.7 Discussion 
It is important to compare remote data collection to on-field approach in order to roughly 
estimate the amount of possible information loss. As discussed, even if examiners had full 
jurisdiction on provider's premises and obtained legal access, the latter is likely to be 
unfeasible because it may require a long preparation phase, remarkable system downtime, 
plenty of resources to make disk copies and the near certainty to gather a vast amount of 
irrelevant information. Nevertheless, assuming that this is possible for a small data center, 
it is worth wondering if a post mortem on-site imaging process, which includes all the 
four phases of ISO/IEC 27037 standard, might entail additional advantages compared to a 
networked logical acquisition. In the following, it will be therefore presented the case of 
the Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS), an architecture suitable for cloud storage  
(Vittal, 2013) that could be necessary to master during an investigation. Indeed, it would 
be largely out of scope making a comprehensive coverage and therefore a sample situation 
will give just an idea of the possible issues, even in the favorable situation of a well-known 
open source technology. Given the number of possible solutions which underlie today's 
object stores, it would however be always necessary for a forensic examiner to evaluate 
each and every situation dispassionately, without feeling overwhelmed in advance by the 
troubles implied in such an endeavor. 
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4.7.1 On site acquisition of a HDFS based object store 
HDFS (The Apache Software Foundation, 2013)a is a resilient distributed file system 
shaped after the Google File System (Ghemawatt, Gobioff and Leung, 2003) which is able 
to scale over thousands of commodity servers. Its architecture is made of a master, called 
Name Node, which implements file system logic and multiple slaves, known as Data 
Nodes, which blindly host file content sliced in chunks (also known as blocks) of 
configurable size. Even in the case of limited setups, making a bit stream copy of all DNs 
without digging in NN working internals, maybe be affected by the inability of uniquely 
associate possible interesting data to their owner. In the NN, metadata are kept in a binary 
file called fsimage which records file system structure, for instance which chunk belongs to 
which file. For performance reasons, fsimage is not updated at every write operation. 
Modifications are saved in an in-memory structure and on a journal file called edits which 
is reconciled at startup and from time to time thereafter. Furthermore, the NN keeps track 
of the placement of chunks only in the volatile memory and periodically queries DNs to 
refresh the picture of which node holds which chunk. Against this background, a patient 
digital evidence specialist well supported by provider's professionals, will probably need 
custom software tools specifically developed for HDFS forensics and a mixed approach 
made of live and post mortem activities. A possible protocol of operations follows: 
1. in the first place, the file system is secured against every possible modification avenue, 
but not powered off at first; 
2. there should be no need to shut the NN down. HDFS is an open source Java project 
and data structures are documented. So it is better trying to take a snapshot of the in-
memory file system image and blocks-DN association, for instance using Java Native 
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Access library. If this were not possible, after having stopped all HDFS processes, 
fsimage and edits are copied and reconciled off line; 
3. then it is necessary to analyze the file system to ascertain which files and folders, 
included the .Trash directory in user's home, belong to the suspect under investigation. 
In case of an off line reconciliation, Apache's Offline Image Viewer can be leveraged for 
dumping fsimage raw data in a human readable format. In this way also the names of 
the blocks which composes the relevant files will be known. In a distributed file system 
these blocks are regular files stored in DN directory tree. 
4. either from the taken memory snapshot or through a dig in the NN log files, if 
available, it is imperative to find the ip addresses of the DN holding the data blocks. 
This point and the next are crucial for identification; 
5. in a standalone file system, such as Ext3 or NTFS, free hard disk clusters are 
permanently available for inspection. Conversely, in a distributed scenario there might 
be no concept of unallocated space. Removing a file corresponds to a deletion of the 
associated blocks in a DN and an addition of a line in NN log, where block name and 
DNs get recorded. This is the only clue to possibly recover these blocks from DNs with 
traditional forensics tools, if disk sectors have not been reallocated. Block recovery can 
be the real added value compared to remote data collection which does not allow to 
restore permanently deleted content. 
6. at this point DNs have been pointed out and can be shut down so to start the collection 
phase. The impact on provider's business of this activity is hard to foretell. If the 
storage subsystem features hardware or software RAID redundancy, which is not 
needed at all for DNs, removed disks can be just replaced. If the number of nodes taken 
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offline is limited the replication capabilities of HDFS could still handle the situation as 
a number of server faults and leave the cluster still operative without other users suffer 
for any data loss. 
7. an acquisition phase follows. To reduce possible system downtime, bit stream images 
of disks could be performed on site, rather than in a lab. 
8. the last step entails preservation: integrity protection codes are calculated at the end of 
the process and due care in handling and storage of copies is observed to prevent 
"tampering and spoliation" according to ISO/IEC 27037 lexicon.  
So what are the revenues of this painstaking process? Content and metadata of allocated 
blocks could of course be obtained via remote collection and so trashed items and past 
revisions. The uncertain benefits could stem from the forensic analysis of DN images. In 
the first place, an inspection of DN file system tables based on names of removed blocks 
may lead to recover deleted files. Furthermore, a pattern match search or a carving activity 
on disk unallocated space may reveal interesting sectors or files. For certain, once this 
content has been restored, its connection with the suspect under investigation must be 
crystal clear, because there is no other way to associate it to the user. Table 4.5 resumes 
pros and cons of on-site forensic acquisition. It can be seen that an on-site approach, if 
possible, must be very carefully planned in the preparation phase from a costs-benefits 
standpoint and it is likely to be justified only in investigative cases of extreme importance. 
There may be occasions however, where an on site acquisition is necessary to achieve an 
intended result, for instance when the cloud provider is not to be trusted or if content 
cannot be retrieved remotely as it does not offer an adequate API from a forensic point of 
view. 
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Pro Con 
Possibility to recover 
permanently deleted files   
Possibly long preparation phase   
Possibility to recover 
valuable data in 
unallocated sectors    
Probable system downtime 
 Remarkable resources to arrange 
disk copies 
 Lengthy copy operations 
 Likely need to devise new scripts 
or software tools 
 Uncertain benefits due to the 
difficulty of finding deleted data 
and associate it to the suspect 
 
Table 4-5 Pros and Cons of on-site forensic acquisition 
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5. REPEATABILITY IN A REMOTE ACQUISITION SCENARIO 
As discussed in section 4.1, remote acquisition tools like Cloud Data Imager can be 
leveraged to perform technical assessments also during the so called phase of preliminary 
investigations (PI),  according to the Italian code of criminal procedurexlvii.  This is the 
period when the prosecuting attorney, once acquired a notitia criminis , performs any 
needed action to assess whether it rests on solid grounds so that it requires a crime be 
prosecuted or ask the judge to drop all charges. According to article 111 of the Italian 
Constitution which introduced the warranties set forth by the so called "fair trial", proofs 
take their shape after an adversarial debate, where all relevant parties compete as peers 
before an unbiased judgexlviii and witnesses are directly or cross-examined.  However, 
there may be times where it is necessary to anticipate the proof making process during the 
PI phase as in the case of unrepeatable investigations concerning evidence whose physical 
condition or state may change. Indeed, traditional forensic activities may entail a chance of 
digital evidence modification because of poor compliancy to best practices shown by 
operators or when the very action of handling or powering on a media cause permanent 
damages to evidences. However, thanks to their extreme resiliency features, cloud 
personal storages are always on infrastructures with an availability percentage in excess of 
99.9 % over the year and risks of mechanical, thermal or electrical shocks do not apply. In 
the following we therefore evaluate the implications to repeatability of remote acquisitions 
performed with tools like CDI in case of personal storages we met in the previous chapter, 
comparing the differences detected among cloud technologies. 
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5.1. Unrepeatable technical assessments  
In the Italian CCP unrepeatable technical assessments are regulated by article 360 which 
belongs to the set of activities performed by the prosecutor during the period of the PI. 
Article 360 states that when the prosecutor needs to perform technical assessments 
concerning  places, people or material whose condition may change, he must give notice to 
all interested parties of the trial (defendants, victims of the crime and all defense 
attorneys) of time and place of the appointment of his trusted expert witnesses (people 
with a specific technical competence in the matter to whom the prosecutor can turn 
according to article 359 of CCP). He must also inform them about the option to nominate 
their own consultants who are rightfully allowed to participate to all technical sessions, 
make comments and vet the correctness of operations. Particularly important for Digital 
Forensics is also the article 117 of Implementing Provisions of CCP which extends the 
scope of validity of the aforementioned article 360 to the cases where the assessment itself 
causes modifications to things, places or people which otherwise would not be liable to 
change. For example an hard disk , if properly stored in an anti- static bag and in the due 
environment, is most likely expected to be immutable over a reasonable time frame, but 
the action of powering it on or the failure to use a proper write blocking device during a 
bit stream image could impose a permanent damage or anyhow cause a modification of its 
bit patterns. A partaken procedure guarantees the protection of the interests of all trial 
parties since the period of PI as some activities, once accomplished, cannot be repeated in 
the future because objects may be irreparably modified. DE acquisitions may belong to 
this category as their handling could entail changes which cannot be undone. 
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5.2. Classification of digital evidence acquisitions  
A correct regulatory placement of digital evidence acquisitions is fundamental to evaluate 
their effects in the penal trial. The recalled article 360 of CCP deals with unrepeatable 
assessments, but these are just a fraction of the possible technical activities which can be 
found during the PI period (Fasolin, 2012) with different protection levels for the 
defendant. Digital evidence specialists can therefore also perform urgent assessments and 
"surveys", typically by sampling material on the crime scene, to avert the risk of evidence 
dispersion or alteration in accordance to article 354 of CCP. This situation entails 
weakened safeguards for the suspect compared to article 360 of CCP, as defense attorneys 
are allowed to attend during operations, but as mere observers and without the right to be 
notified in advance (article 356 of CCP). However, it must be stressed that the code itself 
somehow counterbalances this lack by defining that DE acquisitions be performed by 
police officers, if possible, by immediate and faithful copy on write-once medium of 
original data, paying attention to its integrity and preservation. 
Even less protected for the defendant would be a DE imaging according to article 370 of 
CCP which enables LE to accomplish investigations with the permission of the public 
prosecutor and on his behalf. In this case  no legal assistance is expected as article 370 does 
not recall the aforementioned article 356 (Durante and Pagallo, 2012). Furthermore, in 
addition to cases of urgency, article 348 states that LE, in order to secure all source of 
evidences can accomplish, autonomously or on behalf of the public prosecutor, "acts" or 
"operations" possibly relying on experts which cannot refuse to cooperate. Unfortunately, 
the code does not give a clear definition of such activities nor sets forth a distinction 
whatsoever among assessments and surveys (Sottani, 2011) and (Casasole, 2013). 
However, this gap has been filled by case law and legal doctrine which define the survey 
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an action of mere observation, identification and collection of material that is preliminary 
to an assessment which conversely entails a thoughtful appraisal of the material and a 
production of an opinion (Aprile, 2003). The amenability of digital evidence acquisitions to 
mere surveys has been repeatedly ascertained in statements of the Italian Supreme Court 
of Cassazione according to which: 1) extracting data from a computer is a merely 
mechanical operation which can be reproduced indefinitely and hence does not involve 
unrepeatability profilesxlix; 2) copying a file from a seized computer does not entail any 
evaluation activity from a technical or scientific standpointl.  Relying on this school of 
thought the defendants and their defense counsel are not to be necessarily informed in 
advance when these operations take place. Entirely different conclusions have been more 
recently drawn by the legal doctrine according to which every man-computer interaction 
should happen as an unrepeatable assessment with due warranties for all stakeholders 
and by means of expert witnesses (Fasolin, 2012) . Tonini believes that digital documents 
undergo the same general principles applicable to every evidence according to which, 
when technical activities may alter the assessed objects, it is necessary to previously 
organize an adversarial debate (Tonini, 2012) as stated by the aforementioned article 117 of 
Implementing Provisions of CCP. The repeatable or unrepeatable nature of digital 
evidence acquisitions ultimately appears therefore to be  linked to the possibility of 
alteration of the digital media under observation. So in the case of media that are 
intrinsically read only (such as CDs or DVDs) or when a post mortem acquisitionli of 
powerable devices is operated by an expert which implements all due technical safeguards 
a DE acquisition may be deemed repeatable (Fasolin, 2012).  These safeguards consists on 
leveraging: 
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 software or hardware write blockers which prevent accidental modification of the 
media; 
 uninterruptible power supplies to avert the risk of power outages during lengthy 
operations which would result in unpredictable effects on the evidence; 
 integrity protection codes or (better) digital signatures and certification authority 
issued timestamps. 
Nevertheless, to avert the risk of invalidating an evidence both because there is a residual 
chance that technical operations can possibly damage it in some way or because the 
defendant may later disavow its content, the public prosecutor may ensure that an 
adversarial debate is anyhow established. This is also in anticipation of the day when 
seized evidences will be possibly returned to their owners, as it can happen for laptops, 
smartphones or tablets which are often reclaimed back, and from that time on forever 
modified. However, not always the organization of the activities strictly obeys the 
provisions of article 360 when the public attorney decides to rely on experts of criminal 
police: as operations follows a well-known protocol forged during years of best practices 
and operators are tasked to only acquire the digital evidence without appraising its 
content (as it happens for surveys), there might be no need to organize a meeting where an 
expert witness is appointed, some questions for him to answer are formally put on paper 
and all parties are invited. It is therefore also possible that forensic expert of LE receive a 
pretty standard proxy from the prosecutor (under the provision of article 370 CCP) which 
states that: 1) tools and procedures must ensure that evidence is not changed; 2) there is a 
perfect match between the source and the copies; 3) all defense counsels must be notified 
about the time and place planned for operations inception so to invite their trusted expert 
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witnesses. This is an hybrid process that lies halfway between articles 370 and 360, but 
field experience tells that is a perfectly possible arrangement. 
Conversely, a major impact on repeatability may happen when Live acquisitions come into 
play. Indeed, sometimes it is not considered useful to shut down a working equipment 
like a workstation or server, even in the case of a sudden halt caused by pulling the plug,  
not to lose possible sources of evidence which may reside in volatile memory like active 
network connections, active processes, running programs, encryption keys or unsaved 
documents. This not to mention the possibility that relevant data, for instance related to 
Internet navigation, be purged  after the browser closes or temporary information be 
wiped by housekeeping scripts triggered by a clean system shutdown. Live forensics 
needs to cope with systems which cannot be initially or permanently stopped and whose 
ever changing state may make the assessment truly unrepeatable. Consider the case when 
the forensic expert needs to perform a memory dumplii. System volatile memory changes  
continuously and possibly unpredictably in response to process creation and termination, 
network connection establishment and teardown or allocation/deallocation requests 
issued by running programs. Some degree of alteration is actually introduced by the 
forensic tool itself when its containing USB drive (as an example) is plugged in and new 
process is created in memory by the operative system. This means that repeating the 
experiment consisting in a byte stream acquisition of memory content and calculating the 
resulting integrity code would lead every time to a different hash value. So in the interest 
of the forthcoming discussion, it is necessary to wonder, when a technical assessment is 
not completely repeatable, if all modifications occurred are relevant to classify it as 
unrepeatable (Fasolin, 2012). For instance, losing timestamp information of files as a result 
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of backup restoration as described in section 4.1, perhaps could not bring to evidence 
invalidation if what really matters is its content and creation or modification times are not 
fundamental. In this respect, this action could be deemed substantially repeatable, meaning 
that occurred alterations may be not relevant in the context of the trial as they do not 
impact on the reliability or sufficiency of the evidence. Cesari reaches the conclusion that 
when variations do not influence the outcomes of a new following assessment so that its 
nature and characteristics are preserved, their occurrence is not relevant to classify it as 
unrepeatable (Cesari, 1999). 
5.3. Repeatability in the context of personal cloud storages  
We are now entering an almost unexplored territory for which a very few previous 
contributions exist. A relevant related work concerning repeatability of cloud stored 
content has been produced by Aterno and Mattiucci, according to which imaging of data 
is a dynamic activity which need to be considered not repeatable (Aterno and Mattiucci, 
2013), even if the authors do not make any distinction among cloud service models. 
In section 4.4 we made the consideration that ISO/IEC 27037 standard does not explicitly 
cover cloud storage services and we assumed to deal with non-interruptible mission 
critical systems which can be reached only remotely. This could lead someone into 
thinking that we are facing live systems on which only unrepeatable assessments can be 
made, but this is not necessarily the case. Indeed, we disregard low level activities such as 
memory captures as these features are not yet allowed by platform APIs.  We are rather 
interested in folders and objects which may instead be pretty stable in the due conditions. 
This brings us making the first consideration concerning repeatability of remote 
acquisitions on cloud stores: 
 
108 
 
 as discussed in paragraph 4.4.4, if it is impossible to safely exclude that third parties 
cannot alter the remote content because LE has not exclusive access to suspect's storage 
area or write permissions cannot be removed by the provider from the account, the 
remote acquisition is to be classified as unrepeatable and an adversarial debate needs 
to be organized; 
 conversely, when those safeguards are present and recalling the circumstance that 
cloud personal storages cannot suffer from damages imposed by mechanical, thermal 
or electrical shocks, remote acquisitions targeted to Dropbox can be deemed repeatable 
as inner hashes are immutable. Acquisitions targeted to Google Drive and Microsoft 
OneDrive can be deemed either not repeatable as inner hashes change at every 
experiments due to changing metadata values or can be deemed substantially 
repeatable if one considers these metadata (for instance a temporary file download 
link) irrelevant and unable to invalidate the assessment. More on this later. 
In section 4.6.2.2 we determined by means of hash checking that every sample file 
uploaded in a cloud storage remains unaffected in its content when it is copied back. What 
deserves to be verified at this point is if there is some variation in objects metadata after 
several experiments. In  other words we need to check if two or more consecutive calls to 
CDI library function listFolder or listFileRevisions (see section 4.6.1) bring exactly to the 
same result or some data is altered. It is easily understandable that the latter occurrence 
would lead to ever changing inner hashes each time an imaging experiment of the same 
folder is executed. We then organized a very simple scenario in which a folder named 
RepeatTest was created under the root for every CSP leveraging the associated desktop 
client to keep the content synchronized. This folder contains just one file named original.txt 
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filled with a very short text that we modified just to create a revision. Now we are able to 
capture server side answers when functions listFolder or listFileRevisions are called (the first 
when browsing RepeatTest folder and the second by right clicking of file original.txt to 
show the revisions). Results are discussed in the following sections for every CSP.  
5.3.1 Dropbox  
Calling listFolder corresponds to a secure HTTP GET containing the keyword /metadata and 
folder path in the URL structure. According to Dropbox literature (Dropbox, 2014) the 
JSON formatted answer contains the fields listed in the following table: 
Field Description 
size A human-readable description of the file size (translated by 
locale) 
bytes    The file size in bytes 
path Returns the canonical path to the file or directory 
is_dir Whether the given entry is a folder or not 
is_deleted Whether the given entry is deleted (only included if deleted 
files are being returned) 
rev A unique identifier for the current revision of a file. This field 
is the same rev as elsewhere in the API and can be used to 
detect changes and avoid conflicts 
hash A folder's hash is useful for indicating changes to the folder's 
contents in later calls to /metadata. This is roughly the folder 
equivalent to a file's rev 
thumb_exists True if the file is an image that can be converted to a 
thumbnail via the /thumbnails call 
icon The name of the icon used to illustrate the file type in 
Dropbox's icon library 
modified The last time the file was modified on Dropbox, in the 
standard date format (not included for the root folder) 
client_mtime For files, this is the modification time set by the desktop 
client when the file was added to Dropbox, in the standard 
date format. Since this time is not verified (the Dropbox 
server stores whatever the desktop client sends up), this 
should only be used for display purposes (such as sorting) 
and not, for example, to determine if a file has changed or 
not 
root The root or top-level folder depending on your access level. 
All paths returned are relative to this root level 
revision A deprecated field that semi-uniquely identifies a file. Use 
rev instead 
Table 5-1 Dropbox metadata field description 
Figure 5.1 shows server's answer displayed with JSON Parser Onlineliii. Listing shows 
details of RepeatTest folder which is a child of the root, has size equal to 0, was modified 
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Thu, 01 May 2014 15:04:28 +0000. This folder contains only one file of 24 bytes whose path 
is /RepeatTest/original.txt, was added to Dropbox on Thu, 01 May 2014 15:05:57, was last 
modified on Thu, 01 May 2014 15:05:48 +0000 and has an revision id equal to 2914336529. 
Field is_deleted is not present as it is only returned for deleted entries. 
 
Figure 5-1 Dropbox answer to listFolder call 
Calling listFileRevisions translates into a secure HTTP GET containing the keyword 
/revisions and file path in the URL structure. Server's answer contains two entries whose 
values are already described in table 5.1. As depicted in figure 5.2 the topmost entry 
corresponds to the most updated version of file original.txt, whereas the other is an older 
version added to Dropbox on Thu, 01 May 2014 15:05:25 +0000, was last modified on Thu, 
01 May 2014 15:05:02 +0000 and has a lower revision id equal to 2814336529. It can be seen 
from figures 5.1 and 5.2 that none of the values corresponding to fields in table 5.1 could 
change over time and issuing repeatedly a listFolder call for RepeatTest folder and a 
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listFileRevisions for file original.txt always gives the same results. We confirmed this fact by 
repeating the experiment of imaging the RepeatTest directory after days and weeks finding 
that inner hashes were always immutable.  We can then conclude that Dropbox's remote 
acquisitions are repeatable from a technical point of view and under the hypothesis of 
excluding uncontrolled avenues for modifications of data and troubles due to account 
expiration or provider exiting this kind of business, they can be safely repeated over time 
getting the same inner hashes. The same holds true for hash lists produced during 
imaging operations , but not for outer hashes due to changing service data of NTFS file 
format, such as virtual volume serial number or recording dates. 
 
Figure 5-2 Dropbox answer to listFileRevisions call 
5.3.2 Microsoft OneDrive 
Calling listFolder corresponds to a secure HTTP GET containing the keyword 
me/skydrive/files for the root or me/skydrive/shared/files for shared items or /files and folder id 
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in the URL structure. According to Microsoft documentation (REST reference Live 
Connect, 2014) the JSON formatted answer for file and folder objects contains the fields 
listed in the following table: 
Field Description 
id File or Folder ID 
name (from object) The name of the user who created the folder or uploaded the 
file 
id (from object) The ID of the user who created the folder or uploaded the file 
name The name of the folder or file 
description A description of the file or folder , or null if no description is 
specified 
count The total number of items in the folder (returned for folders 
only) 
parent_id The ID of the folder the file or folder is currently stored in 
link The URL of the folder, hosted in OneDrive or a URL to view 
the item on OneDrive 
size The size, in bytes, of the file (returned for files only) 
upload_location The URL to upload items to the folder hosted in OneDrive or 
The URL to upload file content hosted in OneDrive 
comments_count The number of comments that are associated with the file 
(returned for files only) 
comments_enabled A value that indicates whether comments are enabled for the 
file. If comments can be made, this value is true; otherwise, it 
is false (returned for files only) 
is_embeddable A value that indicates whether a file or folder can be 
embedded. If this folder can be embedded, this value is true; 
otherwise, it is false. 
source The URL to use to download the file from OneDrive 
(returned for files only). This value is not persistent. 
type The type of object; "folder" or "file" 
created_time The time, in ISO 8601 format, at which the folder or file was 
created 
updated_time The time, in ISO 8601 format, that the system updated the file 
last 
client_updated_time The time, in ISO 8601 format, that the client machine updated 
the file last 
access (shared_with 
object) 
Info about who can access the folder (for example "Just me") 
sort_by Sorts the items to specify the following criteria: updated, 
name, size, or default 
Table 5-2 Microsoft OneDrive metadata field description 
Figure 5.3 shows server's answer displayed with JSON Parser Online. Differently from 
Dropbox, there are no more details about RepeatTest folder and the answer consists in an 
array (called "data") of one file objects having size of 24 bytes and ID 
file.12c7e95daeaf4fcd.12C7E95DAEAF4FCD!122 , which was added to One Drive on May 
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the 5th at 20:54:54 UTC and was last modified by the client application on May 1st at 
15:04:48 UTC. As stated in section 4.6.1.4 at the moment there is no way to retrieve data 
concerning deleted files and their past versions so there is no equivalent of Dropbox's 
is_deleted field in table 5.2 and listFileRevisions call is not applicable. 
 
Figure 5-3 Microsoft OneDrive answer to listFolder call 
It can be seen from table 5.2 that the only value which may change over time is field 
"source" which is a temporary URL to the file download location. We confirmed this after 
repeating the call  to listFolder function which returned every time a different virtual 
directory name. We then draw the conclusion that OneDrive's remote acquisitions, even 
under the usual hypothesis of lack of uncontrolled avenues for modifications of data and 
service availability, could be considered not repeatable if one just values the fact that 
inner hashes will change at every acquisition because of changing values of "source" field. 
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Conversely, it can be judged substantially repeatable, if one goes deeper and assumes 
that these variations do not affect core metadata and will not impact the relevance of 
acquired data. After all, download link structure is a provider related service information 
which could appear a trifling detail to the court. Changing metadata at each experiment 
will impact on the hash list produced during imaging operations which will also change in 
the part of xxx_metadata.txt files, but hashes relative to objects however will not. 
5.3.3 Google Drive 
A behavior much similar to Microsoft OneDrive can be detected for Google Drive APIs.  
Calling listFolder corresponds to a secure HTTP GET containing the keyword /files and 
folder id in the URL structure. According to Google literature (Google, 2014) all present 
and deleted files are returned because trashed query parameter defaults to true. The JSON 
formatted answer for file and folder objects contains a plethora of fields that would be too 
long to describe. It is worth noticing however what metadata change every time a listFolder 
command is issued: 
Field Description 
etag Identifier assigned to the file as per HTTP protocol. It 
changes as  it reflects modification of other retuned fields  
thumbnailLink A temporary link to download file's thumbnail 
downloadUrl A short lived download URL for file content 
Table 5-3 Google Drive temporary metadata field description 
downloadUrl field validity can be measured in hours so it will not change for closely run 
remote acquisitions, but tests accomplished after some day reveal that this link do change. 
Similar considerations apply to listFileRevisions calls. Conclusions concerning the 
repeatability of assessments follow the same reasoning seen for Microsoft OneDrive: 
strictly speaking they could be considered not repeatable because of ever changing inner 
hashes due to fields in table 5.3. Substantial repeatability could however be determined 
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before a court that decide to neglect those changing metadata (which again are CSP service 
parameters which seem not to bring any further contribution of knowledge and may be 
deemed  irrelevant). 
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6. THE ALMANEBULA FRAMEWORK 
We now completely switch our point view and consider the Cloud not as a target of 
investigations anymore, but as an ally to forensic investigators which may allow to 
analyze efficiently huge amounts of digital evidences and information sources, possibly 
belonging to the category of Big Data, extract actionable knowledge from them and share 
the results among authorized subjects according to their level of clearance. Modern 
Forensic Computing, the science that deals with techniques and procedures for 
identifying, preserving, analyzing and presenting digital data that could be relevant in a 
court of law (McKemmish, 1999), requires a sharply increasing amount of IT resources as 
the number of computer related investigations continues to grow. The pervasive presence 
in a case of electronic devices, always more heterogeneous, connected and capable, forces 
a forensic expert to manage the availability of gigantic storage areas to host the copies of 
their memory and the result of their analysis. Furthermore, an efficient strategy that keeps 
acceptable delivery times, calls for a huge computational power, not only to visualize 
manifest or hidden content from a single device, but also to extract actionable information 
from a collection of evidences analyzed as a whole. In this scenario, not only traditional 
standalone tools may fall short, but also forensic platforms based on a classic three tiered 
approach (client, application server and central database) may prove themselves 
inadequate because of their intrinsic inability to scale in  and out under the pressure of 
varying workloads. Classic IT architectures resort to over provisioning to accommodate 
the demand bursts but, due to the wide difference between peak and average utilization 
(Armbrust, et al., 2009), their resources may lie pretty undersubscribed. Digital Forensics 
requires a degree of processing power on large collections of documents which has much 
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in common with the Big Data handling that can offer its technological advances to 
evidence analysis. It is therefore imperative coping with these technological aspects to stay 
current to modern scenarios. In this respect, the wealth of available open source toolboxes 
can considerably help building efficient, cost effective and elastic applications. This 
chapter delves into a set of design principles, technical specifications and conceptual 
architecture of a novel forensic platform called AlmaNebula, which leverages the power 
and storage capacity of private/community cloud platforms. A modular petabyte-scalable 
infrastructure geared towards the automatic extraction of actionable knowledge from a 
collection of digital evidences exposed by means of intuitive interfaces. This aims to 
embody the concept of "Forensics as a service", a facility for examiners with very basic 
technical experience that public or private organizations may utilize to grasp all the 
benefits offered by the utility computing paradigm. 
6.1. The cloud as an harbor for forensics services  
Theoretically, it could be admissible to host digital evidences in a public Cloud, if the 
provider were able to offer Government certified services with proper security category as 
in the case of the United States FedRAMP. Public infrastructures  allow a low time to 
market, almost limitless computational power or storage, high service availability, disaster 
tolerance and are often advertised as adhering to severe security and auditing standards. 
Conversely, sharing control on valuable data unavoidably raises concerns about its 
availability, confidentiality and legal compliance as the public offer cloud services is not 
always as transparent as it should be to grant a reasonable peace of mind. As discussed in 
section 2.4, taking the decision to move to a commercial cloud provider is not only a 
technical option, but rather a complex management process which aims at correctly 
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identifying the risks and possibly accept and minimize them when balanced by adequate 
benefits. Central to this risk management plan is contracting some good SLA with marble 
carved clauses that state provider's accountability for information loss or exposure and a 
data takeout policy in a well-documented format. At a minimum, the SLA should allow 
the customer to perform, directly or by means of a trusted third party, a rather complete 
scrutiny concerning: 1) the relevancy in the customer's country of the security 
certifications achieved by the CSP; 2) the criteria for selecting, enforcing and monitoring 
security controls (for instance, it is very important to have insights on aspects like 
employee lifecycle management or system administration procedures); 3) the localization 
of the data and possible issues of applicable jurisdiction issues from its migration; 4) 
compliancy to norms and regulations, in particular concerning data privacy; 5) the 
business continuity policy. Therefore, the natural conclusion is that, at this stage of 
maturity of public cloud offers, a framework for evidence analysis is more likely to be 
targeted towards a private or community cloud deployment. Discussion will not delve 
further into legal implications and assumes that such a platform is always feasible as, at 
least in a private deployment with augmented security measures due to resource pooling, 
court authorizations that were obtained for evidence handling with traditional tools 
continue to stand.  
6.2. Previous and related work 
Papers on advances of forensic platforms (Roussev and Richard, 2004) stressed the need of 
a new class of applications that could harness the power of distributed computing as 
standalone forensic tools, albeit well designed, could fail to deliver timely results. This 
happens under the thrust of the massively growing amount of cheap storage at user 
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disposal and the resulting growing request of computational resources needed to handle 
it. As files extracted from an evidence constitute the most natural atomic unit for a 
cooperative processing, they proposed a prototypal framework running on a Beowulf 
class cluster and having a central process that distributes computing tasks to several 
worker entities and finally aggregates the result. An algorithm able to split an input 
information into pieces that can be dispatched to many remote computational units and 
then merge the intermediate artifacts in a final result was later formalized in the 
MapReduce programming model MR (Dean and Ghemawat, 2008). (Roussev, Wang, 
Richard and Marziale, 2009) acknowledged that MR is a powerful conceptual model for 
describing typical forensic processing but, at the same time, expressed concerns about the 
efficiency on small deployments of Hadoop liv, an open source implementation of MR, 
competitor of the proprietary Google's implementation. This was because of the possible 
lesser efficiency of Java compared to C and the reduced I/O capacity of the Hadoop File 
System, built as an abstraction layer on top of regular file systems (Roussev, Wang, 
Richard and Marziale, 2009). The same authors then devised a framework, named MMR, 
based on the Phoenix shared memory implementation of Map Reduce (Ranger, 
Raghuraman, Penmetsa and Kozyrakis, 2007) that could scale in cluster environments 
because inter-node communication is handled by a MPI compliant library (Message 
Passing Interface Forum, 2009).  The Sleuth Kit (TSK) (Carrier, 2013)b is an open source 
library and a collection of command line tools built upon it, that is able to parse the most 
widespread file system formats (NTFS, FAT, HFS+, Ext2, Ext3, UFS1 and UFS2) packaged 
in an evidence image file and extract files (whether manifest or possibly deleted) along 
with metadata and unallocated sectors. TSK constitutes the foundation of many open 
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source forensic tools  and platforms that either embed the library in the code or parse the 
output of the command tools. The Sleuth Kit Hadoop Framework (Carrier, 2012) is a very 
interesting experimental project that relies on TSK and Hadoop to build a distributed 
system for evidence content extraction, analysis and reporting that is amenable for a cloud 
deployment. Despite many useful analysis features like text extraction, keyword search 
and document clustering have been implemented, there is no user interface yet and 
process outcomes are delivered as JSON report files. The Open Computer Forensic 
Architecture (OCFA) (Vermaas, Simons and Meijer, 2010) is a well-designed forensic 
platform that was designed having in mind scalability, modularity  and openness. It aims 
to automate content extraction of files from digital evidences and it creates a searchable 
index of text and metadata that can be queried by mean of a web browser. OCFA is 
organized in pluggable modules (either derived from already available tools or user 
created) that recursively process an evidence E under the control of a dispatching entity 
called the router, which decides what module to invoke next according to the information 
carried by E. However, module development follows a proprietary schema and 
persistency of data is delegated to a sound, but monolithic PostgreSQL database. In 
(Garfinkel S. L., 2010), often cited hereinafter, an outlook of the digital forensics research in 
the next 10 years is presented, where  the author reviews the limitations of today's tools 
and finds that they are monolithic applications designed to make visible what 
investigators are loking for, when the mere presence of a file is an evidence of a crime, but 
fail to detect information that is out of the ordinary or out of place. The need of more 
intuitive user interfaces able to present information and knowledge to analysts and not 
only mere data is also covered in (Beebe, 2009). 
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6.3. Limitations of current approaches 
Computer Forensics teams, which typically run understaffed, would appreciate the 
opportunity to be relieved form daily IT management activity and, more importantly, 
exploit the potentially vast computational power and storage capacity of Cloud 
Computing (CC) to harbor and analyze digital data. The Cloud would make it possible to 
create elastic and available forensic analysis platforms that can grow or be shrunk 
according to the complexity of the required calculations or the size of the evidences. An 
infrastructure able to cope with demand peaks with no service disruption and, conversely, 
no fear of resource wastage during idle times. The same may not hold true for the main 
currently supported free software or open source solutions that we are going to briefly 
review in the following: 
 Autopsy: The Brian Carrier’s seasoned forensic browser reached version 2.24 (Carrier, 
2013)a and offers a pretty basic way to navigate the directory tree of a disk image, with 
very useful additional features like keyword searching or file timeline reconstruction. 
It is now backed up by version 3, which is a java-based complete rewrite with major 
improvements concerning 1) Performance: the tool doesn’t parse anymore the outcomes 
of the TSK-based command line tools of, but rather use the quicker Java Native 
Interface to call TSK library C functions; 2) Architecture: the modular structure will 
allow an extension of functionality by mean of plug-ins that leverage existing open 
source tools; 3) Flexibility: The result of disk image processing is stored in a SQLite 
serverless database for faster retrieval at a later time. The new release (currently 
available for Windows only) relies on identity management services provided by the 
operative system and it appears conceived for single users running standalone 
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machines. 
 Ptk: PTK Forensics Basic Edition (Forte, 2008) is an alternative to Autopsy based on a 
traditional three tiered LAMP architecture (Linux, Apache, Mysql and PhP) and relies 
on TSK command line tools along with other forensic applications for the heavy lifting 
of content extraction and analysis. Results are presented to the user by mean of a rather 
complete web based interface that includes, among other features, a powerful indexing 
engine. Concurrent case manipulation is possible due to identity management based 
on Username/password authentication. 
 Dff: The Digital Forensic Framework (Altheide and Carvey, 2011) is a single user 
standalone application written in Python and C++ for many operative systems, that 
features a nice GUI and is pretty extensible thanks to its modular architecture. There 
are modules for many processing tasks, ranging from file browsing and volatile 
memory dump analysis to hash comparison and file type statistics. 
 PyFlag: even if the last release of its source code on Sourceforge dates back to 
September 2008, because of its forward thinking architecture the Python Forensic and 
Log Analysis Gui (Cohen, 2008) is still worth a mention. PyFlag is a three tiered 
framework (backed up by a MySQL database) born to perform computer and network 
forensics analysis. Its Virtual File System (VFS) constitutes a powerful abstraction 
where many different source of information like network captures files, log files or disk 
images files can be unified under as single mount point. A file system loader is in 
charge of abstracting the real nature of the underlying source. For instance in the case 
of a tcpdump formatted file, all the packets will be reassembled in streams and loaded 
in the database as objects of the VFS (called inodes), which feature an internal ID plus a 
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string that represents a series of operations (concatenated with a pipe) needed to get to 
each data. These information is a path for Scanners, modules that further processes this 
data at higher level to produce user consumable information and possibly create new 
inodes as in the case of file extraction from a zip archive. 
The aforementioned frameworks have important conceptual mainstays such as the 
modular architecture that lets functionalities to be extended or, given the practical lack of 
standardized formats for file systems metadata representation (Garfinkel S. L., 2010), the 
possibility to use a database as a central storage for data interchange among disparate 
modules. However, despite the great added value they bring to the computer forensic 
community, it is worth noticing the following circumstances: 
 User interfaces made for experts: there is an important distinction between the role of 
a forensic expert and the one of an analyst. The former, according to a limited 
knowledge about the case, prepares the ground for the latter by setting up a container 
where to put all potentially interesting material, be it manifest or hidden, because of 
was deleted, concealed or encrypted at the time of evidence seizure. Tools to 
accomplish this tasks necessarily have complex interfaces in order to allow operations 
that are close to physical nature of devices and that is why all the listed tools have file 
system browsing facilities to visualize the directory structure of disk partitions, with 
advanced features such as enumeration of unallocated sectors or display of file raw 
content. Nevertheless, this wealth of details is not well suited for analysts, whose aim 
is uncovering and linking logically hidden information buried in a huge mess of 
irrelevant data by exploiting their deep acquaintance of the case. Evidence-oriented 
design of interfaces (Garfinkel S. L., 2010) enable technicians to visualize what they are 
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looking for, but do not much help investigators to extract and consolidate actionable 
knowledge.  
 Hardware platform scaling: wherever possible, standalone platforms can improve 
their performance with vertical scaling (Hewitt, 2011), that is empowering the existing 
hardware by adding more CPUs, disks and memory banks. This can help to 
temporarily solve the problem of an increased computational and storage peak load, 
but one is likely time-shifting the moment when a new and more costly monolithic 
architecture will be needed. Furthermore, this is a rigid and coarse grained method to 
scale out, so there is some risks of average underutilization during periods of reduced 
demand. 
 RDBMS issues: public domain relational databases (RDBMS) such as SQLite, MySQL 
or PostgreSQL are a natural choice to represent a data model with relationships 
among entities. RDBMS are rock solid data storages that support a simple, but 
powerful Structured Query Language to perform operations on records  and enforce 
ACID transactions. These properties are fundamental in all class of real time 
applications like airline booking or e-commerce which cannot tolerate an inconsistent 
database status that could be originated, for instance, if two customers accessing the 
system at the same time were both able to book the last remained seat or the last 
available item. Conversely,  RDBMS may bring some issues as of performance and 
scalability (Hewitt, 2011) when the amount of information to handle reaches the Web 
scale: 1) joins: well-structured relational models call for schema normalization 
according to Codd's normal forms and consequent creation of additional tables to 
manage attributes with rank of autonomous entities and many to many relationships 
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among entities. At query time, these tables need to be merged together with join 
operations that are inherently slow; 2) latency: when vertical scaling isn't viable 
(anymore) under the pressure of increasing loads, one can think to approach a 
distributed  RDBMS, where tables are split across several servers. In this scenario, 
strictly enforcing the ACID paradigm means orchestrating distributed operations 
where resources are locked waiting for the commit of a previously initiated 
transaction (Hewitt, 2011). While this can be perfectly acceptable in a high speed local 
network where wait times are kept small, it could cause long delays when remotely 
located servers experience outages or because of the latencies of long haul links; 3) 
schema: relational databases call for a precise up front modeling of tables and columns 
before queries on data can be organized. This approach requires a considerable 
preliminary design effort as further modifications may directly reflect, possibly at a 
large extent, on the low level "plumbing" code that interconnects application and 
database. 
 Basic security: All the listed forensic tools rely on the authentication services either 
provided by the operative system or by the application itself. In a cloud scenario 
however, there is the need to go beyond the baseline security features offered by 
password based authentication as a cloud targeted framework is likely to be hosted in 
a multi-tenant environment (Mell and Grance, 2011), where several users may access 
applications from the public Internet, with a resulting actual risk that a vulnerable 
virtual machine could become a bridgehead to attack other resources. Cloud platforms 
entail a remarkable value concentration which may increase the attack surface. It is 
therefore necessary to strengthen the protection perimeter of information as single 
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factor authentication schemes may no longer suffice to guard sensitive data against all 
possible security threats. 
6.4. Design goals 
Based on the previous assumptions, AlmaNebula's design rests on the principles stated in 
the following sub-paragraphs. 
6.4.1 Cots driven scalability 
A major design goal is achieving an horizontal massive scalability by leveraging 
commodity off the shelf (COTS) hardware: no special shared redundant storage is 
requested, but directly-attached hard disks that every server can host internally. The 
infrastructure should be made of computational units (nodes), possibly arranged in racks 
and connected to pretty general Ethernet network switches, typically up to 1 Gigabit per 
second, with a low cost per port. Overall capacity increase should be reached by 
seamlessly adding new nodes to the network, with no theoretical upper bounds and 
without service disruption. As far as possible, nodes must be peer, without any specialized 
role that could become a single point of failure. Elasticity should be possible by mean of 
automatic facilities that keep under measure machine resources and decide autonomously 
to intervene when load reaches some upper or lower thresholds. Usage of COTS coupled 
with an high level of automation will contribute to lower maintenance costs and achieve a 
relevant degree of investment protection by leveraging existing hardware assets. 
6.4.2 Resiliency 
The platform should be able to tolerate faults occurring at component level, even when 
they are so severe to bring down one or more nodes possibly located in different racks. 
Here the traditional approach of unreliable software based on expensive reliable iron is 
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reversed: fault tolerance and availability is achieved by putting intelligence in the software 
layer and account for failures that may occur more often to commodity hardware. 
6.4.3 Distribution 
A geographical distribution of the computational units should be possible, each of which 
can handle both on line data as well as off-line replicas created for disaster recovery 
purposes. Data replication protocols are expected to be efficient and resilient enough to 
cope with temporarily slow or intermittent WAN links. A distributed forensic system is 
valuable not only to aggregate storage and computing power, but for the possibility to 
pre-process digital evidences locally and avoid unnecessary transfer of data over costly 
long haul networks. We can think for instance to a central forensic institution that has 
some operational branches localized all over the country where digital evidences are 
available. As it is not always appropriate sending the material with a courier or 
performing a possibly costly and time consuming bulk network upload of the whole 
images, one could imagine to extract for example only context related files like documents 
or access logs and transfer them by mean of a compressed data replication scheme for 
further processing at the hub. 
6.4.4 Parallel processing 
As discussed in section 6.2, MapReduce is a conceptual model that cleverly fits to digital 
evidence processing. According to a publicly available implementation of MR, rapidity of 
tasks execution should be achieved by leveraging the power of distributed processing. 
Evidences will be split into atomic entities which will be bestowed concurrently to all 
online nodes. The boundaries of this entities may vary, but in general they can safely be 
considered at file level or as chunks in the unallocated space areas of file system. This will 
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parallelize the tasks that can be accomplished independently by each node such as hash 
calculations.  
6.4.5 Loose ACID compliance 
As a strict RDBMS ACID compliancy seems not so necessary for forensic applications that 
are organized in a preliminary write-only batch processing phase where evidence content 
is extracted and analyzed. As it is usually acceptable that outcomes be available only at the 
end of the process and that accesses to results made by clients will be mandatorily read-
only, we don't expect consistency issues of the database. Therefore, NoSQL technologies 
that guarantee tunable eventual consistency (Hewitt, 2011) measured in a milliseconds 
scale could be employed, when a preliminary evaluation foretell benefits in terms of 
performances, flexibility and scalability compared to RDBMS solutions. Whichever family 
will be selected, using a database may come very handy in a clustered environment to 
facilitate modules integration, store files metadata and even content. In this respect, 
making the server side code DBMS agnostic by means of an abstraction layer trades the 
performances of a fast, but locking-in native interface for a slower, but portable access 
method and it could be a wise design choice should one decide to switch from relational to 
NoSQL databases or vice versa. 
6.4.6 Modularity 
Some forensics solutions are created with an all-in-one philosophy maybe to simplify 
training and promote product lock-in (Garfinkel S. L., 2010). Luckily, examples of modular 
design that leverage third party tools exist in the open source panorama, for instance the 
already mentioned release 3 of Autopsy or Dff. AlmaNebula should be a hosting 
environment for pluggable modules that, upon registration, will be initialized, executed 
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and terminated according to a user defined pipeline, where the output of one will 
presumably be the input of the following. Not only will the framework be able to launch 
modules components, but also to offer some baseline facilities like security, inter-module 
communication or logging. A module is to be meant like a container of functions which 
have a predefined common structure, perform related activities and are exposed in a 
controlled way by means of an interface layer. A module should hide its internals to 
clients that don't suffer for any change in the code as long as the interface remains stable. 
Interaction with other modules should find a formal specification in a structured 
document, usually called manifest, where a module presents a list of capabilities such as 
the functionalities it exports and requires from others along with version level. Structuring 
AlmaNebula as a modular framework would allow to: 1) divide development efforts into 
smaller parts that can be assigned to a team; 2) reuse existing forensic and information 
handling tools with minor modifications; 3) realize an incremental path of development. 
Module development should not be based on proprietary schemes, but rather on well-
known solutions, so to attract the widest audience of programmers which could easily 
reuse their knowledge. In this respect, the OSGi architecture (OSGi Alliance, 2012), a set of 
specifications that define a dynamic component system for Java, is a notable example, 
even if the benefits of a modular approach are programming language independent. 
6.4.7 Openness 
One of the most important restrain factor to a widespread adoption of the Cloud is the fear 
to be locked into proprietary data formats and technologies as this would have a major 
impact on many technical and organizational aspects, starting from the possible high costs 
associated with a provider switch. Instead, a framework which is based from ground up 
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on open standards and possibly on open source would increase the overall level of trust of 
all parties involved. An open architecture is more easily portable, interoperable (The 
Testing Standards Working Party), inspectable and subject to contributions. This would 
bring an important added value, especially to a digital forensics platform that should 
enable all stakeholders to reproduce all operations in the easiest way. Openness is 
important also because, in the choice of the underlying cloud platform, portability and 
interoperability issues should be factored in, as mixed future computation scenarios 
cannot be excluded a priori. As discussed in section 2.5.1, hybrid cloud deployments are a 
viable solution when an organization's IT resources are sized to tolerate the average 
burden, but cannot withstand occasional demand surges. Extra load can then be handled 
by borrowing computational and storage capacity from an external provider that 
guarantees and adequate level of performance and trust. 
6.5. Requirements 
Beyond design principles that inspire the global architecture of AlmaNebula, a number of 
requirements which shape its internals are necessary. 
6.5.1 Cloud service model 
From the final user's perspective, a Software as a Service model is to be selected. 
Customers interface will be a web application accessible by any browser or custom apps 
running on desktop/notebook computers or mobile internet devices. Conforming to the 
Cloud's philosophy of service programmability, platform features will also be directly 
exposed, for example by means of SOAP or REST based web services. This would be 
helpful to allow the final user develop its own interface should the prebuilt application be 
unsatisfying or make available only a subset of functionalities or maybe in case of an 
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integration with already existing forensic solutions. The backend architecture can be 
physical or virtualized, even if the latter solution adds a higher degree of consolidation 
and flexibility in the view of a possible future migration or integration with a third party 
IaaS. For the sake of portability, virtual infrastructure fabric controller (VIFC), the part of 
the cloud infrastructure that interacts with VMM to orchestrate virtual machines (VM), 
should ideally be VMM agnostic or at least implement one that works with well 
documented VMs file formats and preferably supports VM packaging standards like OVF. 
The selected cloud ecosystem should expose its compute and storage capabilities via APIs 
that guarantee the maximum extent of interoperability with other commercial or open 
source cloud solutions. This should happen natively if possible or by mean of abstraction 
layers like the Apache Libcloudlv library, a provider transparent interface for the 
accomplishment of management tasks such as the creation of VM or object listing in a 
storage container. Figure 6.1 shows the conceptual service model: by means of a 
private/public network (N), forensics users (FU) access a cloud application (CA) running 
in virtual machines (VM) managed by a service provider (SP). These VMs are in turn 
hosted in an infrastructure, placed on or off SP's premises, under the control of a cloud 
provider (CP). SP and CP could be different entities or belong to the same organization: no 
assumptions will be made in this respect, as long as a private/community deployment is 
enforced, in order to relax the protection mechanism that would be needed by considering 
a fully public counterpart. In addition to what has been already observed about public 
clouds, it must be added that some arguments exist against the adoption of PaaS model, 
albeit this apparently seems perfect to concentrate on development aspects while 
dropping the burden of IT administration activities. PaaS engines are targeted towards the 
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creation of custom software modules by the general public and therefore usually enforce a 
strict security model that confine user applications in a sandbox with limited access to OS 
features and restricted possibilities as to sub process spawning or response times, among 
others. This may collide with the requirements for the creation and maintenance of an 
open digital evidence analysis platform that is made of several tools which may need to 
have low level access to the operative system (OS) functions and leverage the power of 
any useful DBMS, web server technology or programming language. Furthermore, the risk 
of locking into proprietary technologies is still remarkable as the standards for application 
portability such as the "Topology and Orchestration Specification for Cloud Application" 
(OASIS, 2012) are still draft documents and, even worse, not contributed by cloud 
founding fathers like Amazon or Microsoft. 
 
Figure 6-1 AlmaNebula conceptual service model 
6.5.2 Alternative analysis 
In (Garfinkel S. L., 2010) the author notes that today's forensic tools understandably favor 
completeness in order not to miss any potentially relevant piece of data. However, there 
are times where accuracy could be deliberately traded for speed, for instance when it is 
imperative to achieve a very swift overview of digital evidence content or, maybe, to 
analyze the same set of evidences with a different software just to timely increase the level 
of information recall. Following the directory structure, as file based image processing 
libraries do, translates on many time consuming movements of magnetic HD heads during 
seek operations. Conversely, processing strategies like stream based disk forensics 
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(Garfinkel S. L., 2011) efficiently read the evidence material from start to end as a byte 
stream and extract files by performing a recognition based on known tags or regular 
expressions. This could be a less complete, but fairly quicker option to analyze a forensic 
image, especially in presence of unknown or damaged file systems. AlmaNebula design 
therefore requires that practical implementations give the user the opportunity to select 
when favoring completeness or speed of content and metadata extraction from digital 
evidences. Even better, this could be considered on a per evidence basis in order to 
account for evidence storage systems made of modern solid state disks where heads seek 
penalties do not apply (Garfinkel S. L., 2010). 
6.5.3 Information extraction 
It is undisputable that evidence processing must start with content and metadata 
extraction from allocated and unallocated areas of storage devices by means of tools that 
are either file system structure aware or stream based. Next a shallow analysis phase made 
of file classification and timeline reconstruction, optional keyword search and document 
indexing are still valuable practices. On top on traditional information retrieval (IR), that 
entails a deep domain knowledge as the investigator is required to know in advance what 
to look for to feed the search engines, it's worth considering an information extraction (IE) 
layer, where the same data can be viewed from a different unexpected perspective. This is 
where, without user interaction, named entities like family names, emails or organizations 
are extracted and linked by means of natural language processing (NLP) algorithms 
trained on specific corpora or where documents are clustered together according to 
natural similarities detected using statistical properties of the text they contain (Baeza-
Yates and Ribeiro-Neto, 1999). Applying unsupervised IE techniques was found to be 
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helpful in the discovery of events and relations between entities (Louis and Engelbrecht, 
2011) and may offer further guidance to investigators because potentially interesting 
documents somehow autonomously 'pop up' to his attention. Due to its ubiquitous 
application fields, ranging from business intelligence to brand protection and life sciences, 
there is a strong interest towards machine processing of texts. Despite developing working 
IE tools is a very resource consuming endeavor, there are outstanding examples of open 
source libraries that implement algorithms for data mining tasks like Weka 3lvi as well as 
natural language processing such as LingPipelvii, OpenNLPlviii, GLARFlix or the Apache 
Unstructured Information Management Architecturelx. 
6.5.4 Simplified interfaces 
The need to avoid overwhelming the investigator calls for captivating and intuitive 
interfaces that waive to too technical details of data in favor of knowledge management 
such as automated link analysis,  cross correlation and zooming-in to reduce information 
overhead (Beebe, 2009). In AlmaNebula's dashboard there will be no raw content display, 
logical partition information or directory browsing with screens bloated with files that do 
not bring any immediate knowledge contribution. Instead, an alternative approach will 
consist in presenting the user with baskets belonging to predefined general categories 
(documents, email messages, chats, multimedia and so on) filled with links to files 
classified according to magic numbers in headers or footers. Additional containers will 
reorganize the information base according to its content. For instance documents could be 
grouped based on statistical similarities in their body into predefined categories 
(categorization) that are case specific (e.g. finance reports). Other buckets could be filled 
with named entities detected via NLP algorithms. Inside every container each item could 
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still be displayed in a tabular manner, but with a few detail more than the bare name. If 
requested, it must be always possible for the user to see relevant file metadata (such as 
size or timestamps), for instance by mouse hovering, linking each item to its source to 
verify from which position in the evidence it comes from. When dealing with texts or 
pictures a very short summary or thumbnail displayed next to the file icon could translate 
in remarkable time savings with long lists. 
6.5.5 Case management 
AlmaNebula will present enhanced case management features compared to the missing or 
basic possibilities offered by the most part of the aforementioned tools: 
 some evidence details such as acquisition hashes should be populated automatically by 
parsing logs, if available, in the most widespread formats (e.g. Access Data FTK 
Imager). The case itself and every evidence that belongs to it should bring along also its 
history in terms of multimedia or documental content (e.g. pictures or written reports 
taken at the time of acquisition);  
 as far as possible, in addition to the most common disk image file formats, the platform 
must be able to deal with the most complete variety of data packages. For example, in 
presence of network captures, import modules should be able to parse high level 
protocols, extract relevant stream content (such as web pages or email messages) and 
metadata (e.g. date/time of start and end or ip addresses); 
 a role based case handling policy is to be enforced. System administrators will create 
users accounts or import them from an existing directory service. Managing a case will 
then involve the definition of a list of possible operations that will be performed 
according to rights ranging from the ability to assign permissions and tasks, import 
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digital evidences into the platform, decide how to process them, query the results and 
read the reports. For mere guidance, by default the case creator will acquire the Case 
Owner role which will have full rights granted and the same will apply to other people 
appointed by him. The Investigator role will be enabled to decide the data processing 
criteria as described in the following and have read only access to analysis reports and 
queries. This last ability will be shared with Stakeholders. Roles scope will be a single or 
multiple cases and further rights could be granted or revoked by case owners. 
In figure 6.2 an example of case progression status is illustrated as a state machine that 
evolves from the Empty status just after creation to Ready status after all evidences have 
been processed according to a rule set. Due to the distributed architecture, transitional 
states such as Loading should allow the parallel ingestion of more evidences in the 
platform. Moreover, adding evidences to a case could entail a trivial copy of the whole 
image content into the platform or, for the sake of room and bandwidth saving, a more 
sophisticated identification of some desired content and metadata according to templates 
(see the next bullet). In the latter case, the extraction phase is anticipated from Processing to 
Loading. 
 
Figure 6-2 Case management state machine 
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6.5.6 Team collaboration 
Enabling multi user case management so more investigators can access a common 
repository may be not enough to guarantee a fruitful collaboration among all interested 
parties. Managing a digital investigation is a shared process made of steps in which many 
different technical, investigative and legal skills are required. Considered the usually 
different background of all actors involved, collaboration facilities that allow, for instance, 
for a formal definition of what kind of information must be extracted from the evidences 
while maintaining an user friendly graphical interface, would be much more productive 
than statements expressed verbally or written in natural language. An example of 
evidence processing design is depicted in figure 6.3. An analyst or investigator (and not a 
forensic expert) is requested to decide what kind of information is worth extracting 
globally or on a per evidence basis. The interface is as intuitive as possible with prebuilt 
feature extraction and performance profile templates that could tailor the current case. For 
instance in a financial investigation could be worth detecting only manifest or deleted 
documents and email messages instead of Internet browsing history or chat conversations, 
but with most accuracy by leveraging file systems aware libraries such as TSK that value 
files metadata too. At other times, just multimedia content could be deemed important to 
be extracted as quickly as possible with stream tools like Scalpellxi or PhotoReclxii which 
carve allocated and unallocated disk areas and cluster slack spaces. In any case, user 
preferences will be converted to a formal description syntax such as XML or stored in the 
database for further processing. Secure instant messaging, a wiki for novice members of 
the team and integration with social tools like Twitter for timely sharing of non-sensitive 
communications (for example a tweet to announce that the results of the analysis are 
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ready) are just examples of collaboration features that could add an important value 
during the whole lifetime of a case.               
 
Figure 6-3 An example of evidence processing design 
6.5.7 Security 
Cloud platforms can be more challenging for digital forensics labs than the usual setups in 
a private local area network. A ready-to-scale infrastructure must be aware that it could 
grow and be organized into many geographically dispersed sites possibly communicating 
over public networks. Furthermore, a major breakthrough would be achieved by granting 
a secure and ubiquitous network access to mobile users that allowed them to examine all 
investigation reports via smart devices. Digital evidence can bring a huge added value to a 
case, so it must be kept safe from prying eyes of external intruders and insiders as it can be 
easily altered, especially in cloud deployments that are logically siloed, but physically 
shared. Evidence manipulation could prove even more detrimental for a case than its 
knowability by unauthorized aliens. In order to avert the risk that it loses its mandatory 
features of completeness and reliability (Braid, 2001), it is necessary to consider an 
appropriate level of information assurance as one of the AlmaNebula's design pillars. In the 
following, a set of minimum security requirements will be specified and practical 
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implementations are free to consider any other measure aimed at enhancing the overall 
protection level. The threat model considers a private/community deployment and 
assumes that no harm can come from insiders, notably system administrators, who could 
observe the state of a VM from the outside (CPU registers, memory space and so on) by 
means of virtual machine introspection (VMI) (Garfinkel and Rosenblum, 2003). Given the 
trust relationship with the computing environment, guest VM are assumed globally 
integer at setup and exposed to risks of cyber attacks only when a connection to a network 
is operated. Potential victims are both forensic users and cloud applications against which 
several attacks can be mounted only from outsiders, ranging from theft of credentials to 
remote exploit of code flaws or misconfigurations, to compromise the integrity and 
confidentiality of data or get in control of a tenant to attack others. A set of minimum 
security requirements is specified as follows: 
1) Requirement 1 - Encryption: data should be protected with strong encryption 
schemes, preferably based on standard algorithms like AES,  when in transit and 
optionally at rest; 
2) Requirement 2 - User multifactor authentication: a strong authentication is 
mandatory for forensic applications irrespective of the type of access. FU must log in 
by means of a multifactor authentication scheme (Federal Financial Institutions 
Examination Council, 2005), that is based not only on what user knows, but also on 
what user has or is. Whichever solution will be selected, it must be considered that in 
presence of portable appliances like tablets it could more practical to input the 
authentication code via keyboard instead of plugging smart card or biometric readers. 
For example, a simple two factor implementation could enforce a traditional 
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username/password couple backed up by a one-time password (OTP) sent by the 
platform to the user via SMS. The second factor could also leverage software or 
hardware tokens compliant to various algorithms designed by the Initiative for Open 
Authenticationlxiii (OATH) such as HMAC based One-Time Password (HOTP, RFC 
4226), Time based OTP (TOTP, RFC 6238) or OATH challenge response (OCRA, RFC 
6287).; 
3) Requirement 3 - Evidence content tampering control: files content and properties 
must be hashed and possibly signed upon extraction from disk images or before being 
imported into the platform so that, if performance penalty is tolerable, every data 
handling operation can be preceded by genuineness verification to avert the possibility 
that it was tempered with; 
4) Requirement 4 - Audit trail: every effect stemming from users interaction with the 
platform, from login to evidence handling, processing or returned errors must be 
documented and recorded in a detailed audit log which should be signed, 
timestamped (if this feasible) and cannot be directly altered through the user interface. 
An operation log where all steps performed by the platform following user instructions 
must also be produced. Logs may have more than one verbosity level, should be 
rotated and kept safe according to corporate security policy; 
5) Requirement 5 - VM monitor (optional): Guest VMs should be vetted by integrity 
monitors like ACPS (Lombardi and Di Pietro, 2011), which leverage VMI to intercept, 
record and evaluate all suspicious guest activity such as system calls invocation. 
Monitoring VMs from the VMM allows an effective and hardly detectable way to 
notice threats like rootkit outbreaks. This must be compared to traditional host based 
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defense measures which have an excellent view of the system state, but may be 
detected and subverted by the malware (Garfinkel and Rosenblum, 2003). 
6.6. ARCHITECTURE 
An overview of the platform proposed as IaaS is sketched in figure 6.4: 
 
 
Figure 6-4 AlmaNebula IaaS architecture with type I VMM 
6.6.1 Cloud operative system 
The Cloud OS plays the fundamental role of fabric controller (VIFC) as it interacts with 
VMM to manage VMs behavior. It may offer ancillary services such as device block store 
that can be attached to VM instances (much like USB external drives) or reliable object 
storing, used for instance for backup purposes. Cloud OS is made of many software 
components that can run on several commodity machines for load distribution and fault 
tolerance, but all-in-one deployments should be possible, at least for evaluation purposes. 
A web services API allows user programs like Management Dashboards to monitor and 
orchestrate the operations of each and every component for example starting, stopping, or 
metering VMs. The API can be accessed from inside VMs as well in order to consume 
ancillary services. As already stated, it is desirable that the VIFC be VMM agnostic. 
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Limiting our scope to open source cloud software solutions, it is worth mentioning 
OpenNebulalxiv, OpenStack and CloudStacklxv as good candidates for the role of Cloud OS. 
6.6.2 Virtual machine manager 
A type I VMM setup (Goldberg, 1973) that runs directly on commodity not redundant 
hardware could be selected, but type II VMMs (hosted) that lie on top of an host OS are 
also possible. In the latter case, Cloud OS components and VMs can be mixed and 
matched on the same physical hardware. For portability purposes, VMM should support 
well documented or, better, standard VM image file packaging like OVF. Type I VMM 
examples are Xenlxvi, Microsoft HyperVlxvii or VMWare ESX/ESXi lxviii, whereas KVMlxix is 
a type II solution. Virtual machines host the distributed storage which is created on top of 
their virtual hard disks. They should be guest OS agnostic. During evidence processing, 
VMs are started according to availability and the chosen Map function. 
6.6.3 Storage layer 
An efficient, resilient and distributed storage layer is the foundation of a reliable digital 
evidence analysis platform whose goal is achieving parallel calculations among peers 
while scaling seamlessly by adding new nodes to the pool. A database is a convenient way 
to integrate modules pipelining and store metadata of evidence files in order to leverage 
filtering and sorting capabilities. File content can be inserted in the database too, even if it 
could prove more handy using the storage space of the file system, where some existing 
tools like search engines can process them directly without prior extraction. To cope with 
this issue, another interesting possibility is realizing a distributed file system as an 
abstraction layer on top of the database, creating a mediation module that converts POSIX 
calls such as open() or read() into SQL queries, as the Filesystem in user space project lxx 
(FUSE) shows. Viable DBMS solutions are for example MySQL Cluster lxxi in the full ACID 
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compliant domain and Cassandralxxii or HBase in the NoSQL domain, the latter being the 
DBMS of choice for the Apache Hadoop project. In the storage abstraction layer also the 
functionalities to shield to applications the internals of DBMS should find their rightful 
place. If a regular distributed file system is to be preferred, the choice should privilege 
highly available solutions that could be installed on top of modern journaled file systems 
like Ext4 or XFS. In this respect, Hadoop native file system HDFS could be an option much 
like Cephlxxiii or Gluster FSlxxiv. The latter are examples of clustered user space file systems 
that can scale to petabyte and can be a valid  HDFS substitute. 
6.6.4 Cloud application and API 
The cloud application will be made of pluggable modules that will be pipelined under the 
supervision of the control logic to reflect user configuration. The Content & Metadata 
ingestion module will preliminarily populate the storage and prepare the ground to the 
following modules, notably: 1) Information Retrieval (IR) that will perform text indexing 
and pattern searching according to exact matching and regular expressions; 2) Information 
Extraction (IE)  which will extract named entities and will cluster documents; 3) Super-
timeline reconstruction that, overtaking the limit of the traditional timeline reconstruction 
based just on file last modification date/time, will also dig into several log types to rebuild 
a more comprehensive picture of events. Log2timelinelxxv is an outstanding example of an 
open source super-timeline creation tool that could be repurposed. More modules can be 
added to perform more functions. A web services based Application Program Interface 
will expose platform capabilities to web applications and mobile apps after a strong user 
authentication has been performed by the Security module as described earlier in the 
requirements section. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
In this thesis paper we considered the dual role that Cloud Computing platforms can play 
in relation to Digital Forensics. From the point of view of an investigation, when crime 
related information is hosted in a cloud storage platform, it may not be possible to follow a 
traditional approach based on bit stream copying of seized mass memory or rely on cloud 
provider data delivered without a sound "Forensics as a service". As previous and related 
work showed, applications devoted to remote data acquisition with forensically sound 
architectures are not very widespread to date and general purpose tools are used which 
lack of fundamental features such as read only access or precise audit trails. This opens a 
broad avenue for the exploration of application program interfaces exposed by personal 
storage facilities. In this work we demonstrated that, when these interfaces are accessed at 
the lowest possible level of web services, they are amenable for building valuable forensic 
tools because of their ability to retrieve existing and trashed files or their past revisions. In 
this respect, providers are encouraged to empower the capabilities of their programming 
endpoints by offering functionalities which allow  accessing further details such as the ip 
address of the user workstation and login times. A discussion has been presented 
concerning the comparison between remote acquisition and on-site collect-acquire 
approach in the case of  the well-known Hadoop Distributed File System, concluding that 
the latter could be prohibitive, albeit necessary in some occasions to attempt recovering 
permanently deleted data which would be irreparably lost otherwise. We developed a 
library which handles write protected access to selected remote folders and masks to 
overlying applications all the differences existing in several cloud technologies. We also 
built a prototypal application, namely Cloud Data Imager, which leverages the library to 
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safely browse a remote account and perform a logical copy of all retrievable objects and 
their metadata in a raw NTFS volume exported to an expert witness container. The first 
evidences based on stress and functionality tests confirm that CDI faithfully traverses a 
selected remote directory and more test beds will be performed in the future. Some very 
interesting development directions include: 
 the reliability of the network connection may have heavy impacts on CDI's behavior. 
Just to make an example, if the network fails while a file is being downloaded the 
entire process must be restarted as in the aforementioned two failed test runs. 
Implementing provisions for resuming a download from the point of interruption 
would certainly contribute to increase the robustness of the application; 
 based on the concept of class interface, CDI Library is easily extendable to handle 
many other storage providers that expose their platforms via http services. Amazon 
Simple Storage services and Openstack Swift will be first to be evaluated. 
Unprecedented results were also achieved in the domain of repeatability of technical 
assessments concerning cloud personal storages. Field tests have demonstrated that, when 
external avenues for content modification can be excluded, remote acquisitions 
accomplished with tools like CDI are always repeatable for Dropbox accounts. For Google 
Drive and Microsoft OneDrive they can be considered substantially repeatable, if one 
considers ultimately irrelevant in the context of the trial the ever changing field values as 
they are internal CSP service information unrelated to the target account core metadata. 
Regarding the Cloud as a support tool for clever evidence analysis, the contribution lies in 
the description of the design goals, requirements and architecture of a novel cloud enabled 
forensic application which exploits the computational power and storage capacity of 
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collaborating commodity machines to process huge collections of digital evidences. 
Discussion showed that, compared to some well-established forensic solutions listed in 
paragraph 6.3, several new features and improvements can be proposed that would be 
valuable also for non-technical final users. The most important design goals and 
descending requirements that fuel the platform are resumed in figure 7.1. 
 
Figura 7-1 Summary of AlmaNebula's design goals and requirements 
Next step in the research path is the development of a fully functional prototype to realize 
the concepts expressed so far. In the testing phase it will be interesting to monitor how 
evidence processing time varies according to the number of collaborating VMs. Indeed, in 
presence of a satisfactory Service Level Agreement with the CSP and if legal compliancy to 
norms and regulations were satisfied, a hybrid or even fully public cloud deployment is to 
be accounted for as a short/medium term possibility. This could change much the threat 
model as the hypothesis of trusted computing environment may no longer hold, if 
malicious activity of insiders are deemed possible, but this much depends on how 
transparently the cloud provider will be willing to cooperate and share information about 
its information assurance plan. Adapting the security requirements of outsourced 
computations to commercial CSP, in a way that also considers the legal issues, will be 
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another major development direction of the current work. Granting an adequate degree of 
information assurance and regulatory compliance at any time is inherently linked to the 
level of trust that cloud customers are willing to concede to their CSPs and therefore plays 
a starring role in the weighted decision of going cloudy. In a public cloud scenario security 
requirement 5 of section 6.5.7 may not be applicable and, if the hosting environment 
cannot be trusted in principle, requirement 1 needs to be discussed. Indeed, an abuse of 
VMI techniques could frustrate state of the art disk encryption if a malicious insider were 
able to recover decryption keys stored in RAM. In this case, encryption schemes like 
AESSE (Muller, Dewald and Freiling, 2010), which were devised to resist to cold boot 
attacks by storing keys in special CPU registers, will fall short if VMI tools have access to 
those registers. Other approaches that leverage virtual Trusted Platform Modules (vTPM) 
(Berger, et al., 2006), so that secure storage and cryptographic functions of TPMslxxvi are 
available to applications running on VMs, are questionable too if vTPMs happen to be 
under CSP exclusive control. Furthermore, garbage collectors and user programs may not 
clear memory spaces after deallocation, leaving sensitive content readable by means of 
VMI access to those spaces. An implementation based on Secure Coprocessorslxxvii 
(Sadeghi, Schneider and Winandy, 2010), where not only crypto keys are stored, but also 
complex calculations may take place, is interesting, but may collide with the possible lack 
of specialized hardware in commodity servers and might be feasible only as extra privacy 
service offered by the provider. Accessing kernel and userland memory from the VMM is 
to be avoided or at minimum evaded in presence of a possible hostile computational 
environment, but this much depends on VMM implementation and introspection 
techniques. Some proposed evasion proof of concepts exploit the fact that VMI libraries 
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like XenAccess, now evolved into vmitoolslxxviii project, rely on guest operating system 
kernel integrity to fill the so called semantic gap (Payne, Carbone and Lee, 2007). This  
consists into mapping the raw view offered by VMI memory page reads into a meaningful 
high level representation of processes and files. This paves the way to evasion techniques 
such as DKSM (Bahram, et al., 2010), that are able to present any desired external 
representation of the VM state by tampering with kernel data structures (syntax or 
semantics based manipulation). 
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xxi
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 https://standards.ieee.org/develop/project/2302.html 
xxiii
 http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/11/50 
xxiv
 EU’s flagship initiative for a flourishing digital economy by 2020 
xxv
 Reding’s speech at a meeting of the European Privacy Platform Group in Brussels, march 2011 
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 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0529:FIN:EN:PDF 
xxviii
 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/government-cloud-strategy 
xxix
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xxx
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xxxi
 http://gcloud.civilservice.gov.uk/files/2012/05/G-Cloud-Services-IA-Requirements-and-Guidance-version-1-0-_for-
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xxxii
 https://www.cesg.gov.uk/Pages/homepage.aspx 
xxxiii
 http://gcloud.civilservice.gov.uk/about/sales-information/ 
xxxiv
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xxxv
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xxxvi
 http://cloud.cio.gov/fedramp 
xxxvii
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xxxviii
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 http://www.ag.gov.au/NationalSecurity/ProtectiveSecurityPolicyFramework/Pages/default.aspx 
xl
 http://www.asd.gov.au/infosec/ism/ 
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 Art.1 of Constitutional law 23 nov 1999, n. 2 which modified art. 111 of Italian Constitution 
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 Cassazione Sez. I 30 aprile 2009 Corvino in CED Cass. n. 244454 
l
 Cassazione Sez. I 5 marzo 2009 Aversano Stabile  n. 14511 
li
 Post mortem acquisition of digital evidence imply their preliminary shutdown and removal from their location   
lii
 Examples of tools for memory capture for Windows are FTK Imager or Belkasoft Live RAm Capturer 
liii
 http://json.parser.online.fr/ 
liv
 Hadoop and its underlying file system HDFS are projects of the Apache foundation (http://hadoop.apache.org/) 
lv
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lvi
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